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Executive Summary 
 
Although microfinance has played a significant role in providing a wide range of 
financial products and services, many microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Kenya still face 
major challenges with efficiently and effectively delivering microfinance services in the 
country. As the demand for these services continues to grow, the limited sources of 
available capital have greatly undermined the capabilities of MFIs to efficiently operate 
their services and expand their various microfinance activities.1 This has led to a 
financial gap in the supply of microfinance services, and consequently has reduced the 
opportunities for the poor to access basic socio-economic benefits that could potentially 
improve their wellbeing. 
The widening financial gap in the microfinance sector has been attributed to self-
governance issues, capacity building issues, non-compliance with reporting requirements, 
and a lack of appropriate performance criteria. These and other factors have jeopardized 
MFIs sustainability and have compromised the delivery of microfinance services in the 
country. 
While the Association of Microfinance Institutions (AMFI) has been playing a vital 
role in promoting the growth and development of microfinance through building the 
capacity of MFIs, the organization still faces challenges in its efforts to promote 
sustainable, efficient, and effective delivery of microfinance services.  
There is a need for a policy that advocates for better access to capital sources and 
investment opportunities for microfinance sustainability, and also encourages MFIs to 
increase their accessibility, build capacity, be more transparent, adopt acceptable 
performance standards, and promote professionalism to enhance service delivery. 
This paper analyzes three policy alternatives which include: (i) maintaining the status 
quo, (ii) government regulation of all MFIs, and (iii) voluntarily self-regulating by 
member MFIs as alternatives for closing the financial gap in the supply of microfinance 
services. All the three alternatives are evaluated against the following criteria: efficiency, 
financial and political feasibility, and accessibility to determine the best policy option. 
Based on the evaluation criteria, combining government and self-regulation policies 
offer the best prospects for ensuring a favorable microfinance environment is created in 
Kenya. In addition, combining the two policies offer MFIs opportunities to raise their 
efficiency and effectiveness in delivering microfinance services, while offering the 
Government of Kenya an opportunity in freeing up resources for development in the 
country.2 
Overall, the policy alternative of combining government regulation and self-
regulation policy has the greatest potential in addressing the limited sources of capital 
that is undermining the capabilities of MFIs in Kenya to efficiently operate and expand 
their microfinance activities.
                                                 
1
 According to the Problem Tree analysis of the microfinance sector in Kenya, the root causes that have mainly contributed to the 
financial gap include the following: weak capacity building procedures, lack of performance criteria, weak transparency and 
accountability systems, and weak regulatory framework that have greatly undermined the capabilities of MFIs to effectively operate 
and expand their activities (see Annex a). 
2
 see Annex e: Evaluation of Alternatives 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the feasibility of microfinance investment funds (MIF) as key 
drivers for channeling alternative sources of funding to microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
and in helping with the expansion of microfinance in Kenya. As demand for microfinance 
services continues to grow, MFIs will have challenges in delivering microfinance 
services, which will adversely impact their future growth and development. The growing 
competition to access funding sources has led to a financial gap3 in supplying 
microfinance services, which is jeopardizing MFI sustainability in the country. In 2006, 
the Microfinance Act was passed to enhance the regulatory and legal framework for 
microfinance and to support the growth and development of microfinance in Kenya.4 
This has greatly helped boost the sector resulting in increases in microfinance loan 
volumes, especially for deposit-taking MFIs such as Equity Bank, K-Rep Bank,5 and 
Jamii Bora. The ability of MFIs to collect deposits has some advantages, especially as the 
pool for alternative funding shrinks. Accordingly, the major arguments for attracting 
MIFs to incorporate or invest in the country is that in addition to channeling alternative 
sources of funds, it also supports MFIs in their early stages of development to grow and 
to be more attractive to investment opportunities.6  
Although microfinance has been playing a significant role in providing a wide range 
of financial products and services, many MFIs in Kenya still face major challenges in 
their efforts to efficiently and effectively deliver microfinance services.7 A vast majority 
of the MFIs in Kenya are informal and unregulated,8 which has limited their funding 
sources further weakening their institutional capacity to supply microfinance services and 
limits their ability to grow.                            
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Microfinance Sector 
 
2.1.1. Oversight Body Overseeing Microfinance 
In 1999, the Association of Microfinance Institutions (AMFI) was registered under 
the Societies Act as an umbrella organization to represent the microfinance institutions 
operating in Kenya. The AMFI’s activities were initially funded through a 3-year grant 
from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aimed to 
support the growth and development of MFIs, by promoting sustainable, efficient, and 
                                                 
3
 Financial gap is defined as the difference between the existing supply of financial services and the actual ‘formal’ financial services 
supply required in the country (see Figure 2). 
4
 (2006). The Microfinance Act, 2006. C. B. o. Kenya. Nairobi, The Government Printer. No. 19: 589.  
5
 CGAP (2008). The Rating Fund: The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.  
6
 Devaney, P. L. (2006). Omidyar Network and the SEEP Network Microfinance Investor Roundtable: Major Themes and Next 
Steps. Microfinance Investor Roundtable. P. L. Devaney. Washington, D.C.: 6 pages.  
7
 FSD (2007). Financial Access in Kenya: Results of the 2006 National Survey. FinaAccess Study. finaccess. Nairobi, Financial 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya: 44 pages.  
8
 Omino, G. (2005). Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions in Kenya. C. B. o. Kenya, IRIS Center.  
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effective delivery of microfinance services. Further, AMFI aimed to organize a network 
of MFIs in the country who were committed to developing and making available a wide 
array of microfinance services to those who needed it, especially those whose needs were 
unmet by the formal financial sector.9 
AMFI has been playing a vital role in promoting the growth of microfinance in Kenya 
in addition to supporting MFIs to build capacity in order to overcome some of the 
challenges facing the sector. AMFI was instrumental in drafting and preparing the 
Microfinance Bill, which was passed and enacted into law in 2006.10  
 
2.1.2. Microfinance Institutions 
While Kenya has more than 25011 organizations that practice some form of 
microfinance business, only 20-practice pure microfinance, of which 3 are deposit-taking 
and 17 are credit only. The remaining 230 MFIs combine microfinance with social 
welfare activities.12 According to the Microfinance Act,13 MFIs in Kenya are classified 
into three different tiers, with the first tier being deposit-taking institutions such as banks, 
the second tier being credit only facilities, and the third tier being informal organizations 
supervised by an external agency other than the government.14 These distinct 
classifications have led to some of the MFIs specializing in certain niche markets, which 
have contributed to their growth and sustainability in delivering microfinance. For 
example, the ability to collect deposits has enable Equity Bank to appeal to those 
excluded by the high the high costs of accessing traditional banks,15 while Jamii Bora has 
identified itself as the financial provider to former thieves and beggars.16  
 
 
           
 
                                                 
9
 USAID/Kenya. (2003). "The Association of Microfinance Institutions." Agriculture and Microenterprise Development  Retrieved 
2/2, 2008, from http://www.usaidkenya.org/ke.agbuen/activities/microfinance.html.  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 SantaMaria, A. (2007). "Microfinance Regulations in Kenya." MicroFinance Sector  Retrieved 1/28, 2008, from 
http://www.parismfn.org/parismfn/2007/in_kenya_there_.html.  
12
 Omino, G. (2005). Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions in Kenya. C. B. o. Kenya, IRIS Center.  
13
 (2006). The Microfinance Act, 2006. C. B. o. Kenya. Nairobi, The Government Printer. No. 19: 589.  
14
 Omino, G. (2005). Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions in Kenya. C. B. o. Kenya, IRIS Center.  
15
 Johnson, S., M. Malkamaki, et al. (2006). "Tackling the 'Frontiers' of Microfinance in Kenya: The Role for Decentralized 
Services." Small Enterprise Development 17(3): 13 pages.  
16
 Microcredit (2008) Beggars, Savers and Borrowers: The 'Good Families' of Jamii Bora. Microcredit Summit E-News Volume,  
DOI: March 2008  
Figure 1: Microfinance structure and MFI market share in Kenya 
Source: (Omino 2005) 
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In 2007, Kenya received global recognition during the Group of Eight (G8) summit in 
Berlin for the progress made in the microfinance sector. On behalf of the sector, James 
Mwangi of Equity Bank was honored at the summit with the 2007 Global Vision Award 
on Microfinance,17 a considerable milestone, which has highlighted the success of 
microfinance in the country. 
 
2.1.3. Challenges in Microfinance 
Despite the enactment of the Microfinance Act, AMFI still faces challenges in 
building the capacity of the microfinance sector and reducing the inefficient delivery of 
microfinance products and services. Furthermore, the continued success and rapid growth 
of microfinance has led to a financial gap in the funding needed to meet the growing 
demand.18  
 
 
 
This could seriously impact the ability of Kenyans to access the financial 
resources needed to obtain basic socio-economic benefits such as education, healthcare 
services, land ownership, income generating activities, and credit facilities. A study on 
the financial sector found that 35.2 percent of Kenyans in need of financial services, 
where unable to access the formal financial services.19 In addition, there was another 30.2 
percent who are entirely excluded from accessing any financial services (see Figure 2). 
This has greatly undermined the overall wellbeing of the poor people by limiting their 
opportunities to improve their socio-economic status. 
 
          
                                                 
17
 Ombara, O. (2007). Equity Bank CEO to Address G8 Meeting. The Standard. Nairobi, The Standard Group.  
18
 FSD (2007). Financial Access in Kenya: Results of the 2006 National Survey. FinaAccess Study. finaccess. Nairobi, Financial 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya: 44 pages.  
19
 Ibid.  
Figure 2: Distribution of financial services in Kenya 
Source: (FSD 2007) 
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2.2. Sociopolitical Setting 
 
2.2.1. Demographics 
According to the World Development Indicators (WDI), Kenya’s population was 
estimated at 35,143,188 in 2006, which represented a percentage change increase of 17.9 
percent from the 2000 population results.20 In addition, the demographic data from WDI 
found that in 2006, Kenya’s population was growing at a rate of 2.42 percent per annum21 
and it is estimated that the projected population will reach 38,929003 by 2010 if the 
current growth rate continues. 
The urban population growth rates are significantly higher than the national growth 
rate for the period 2000-2006 at 5.94 percent, while the rural population growth rates are 
far below the national average for the same period.22 The population density in Kenya is 
about 62 people per square kilometer with about 79 percent of the population living in the 
rural areas and the remaining 21 percent live in the urban areas. Additionally, 
approximately 54.4 percent of Kenyans are in the age group 15-64. The population is 
young, with 42.8 percent of the population aged 0-14 years and only 2.8percent aged 65 
years and over (see Annex d).23 
 
 
Population Annual growth rate (%) Population density (pple/sq. km) Population 
distribution 2000 2006 1990-2000 2000-2006 2000 2006 
 
Rural population 
Urban population 
Total Population 
24643533.6 
6045798.404 
30689332 
27763118.15 
7380069.381 
35143187.53 
-3.20% 
-3.66% 
3.10% 
0.97% 
5.94% 
2.42% 
43.29 
10.62 
53.91 
48.77 
12.96 
61.74 
 
 
2.2.2. Labor and Employment 
 The WDI data on labor and employment take into consideration the gender 
distribution in agriculture, industry, and services and factor it as a percentage of the total 
male or female in employment. In Kenya, the service sector is the largest contributor to 
GDP comprising more than 67.6 percent of the total share of the economy, while 
agriculture is 16.6 percent and industry is 16.52 percent.24 
 
                                                 
20
 WDI (2007). Kenya's  Population Size and Population Distribution, World Bank.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid.  
 
Gender Distribution of Labor in the Economy 
Distribution 
Percentage 
Employees, agriculture, female (% of female employment) 
Employees, agriculture, male (% of male employment) 
12.39 
20.81 
Employees, industry, female (% of female employment) 
Employees, industry, male (% of male employment) 
9.40 
23.64 
Employees, services, female (% of female employment) 
Employees, services, male (% of male employment) 
79.56 
55.63 
Table 1: Population size, population density, and annual growth rates of Kenya (1990 – 2006) 
Source: (WDI 2007) 
Employment in
agriculture (% of total
employment)
Employment in industry
(% of total employment)
Employment in services
(% of total employment)
Source: (WDI 2007) 
Table 2: Extrapolated labor distribution in the economy Figure 3: Extrapolated labor distribution in the economy 
Source: (WDI 2007) 
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 However, based on Kenya’s national survey by Financial Sector Deepening (FSD), a 
majority of the population is dependent on agriculture for employment.25 Although the 
service sector accounts for more than 67.6 percent of GDP, about 75 percent of the 
population is employed in the agricultural sector.26 
 The labor participation rate as a percentage of the total population (15 years and over) 
is 81 percent, the participation rate for men is much higher at 90 percent while female’s 
participation rate is below the total average at 71 percent (see Table 2).27 
                                                                                    
2.2.3. National Income Distribution 
A study by the Society for International Development (SID) found that the 
distribution of income in Kenya was extremely uneven and the rich controlled a large 
portion of the national income. According to the study, 42 percent of the national income 
in the country was in the hands of 10 percent of the richest households, while only 0.76 
percent of the national income was in the hands of the lowest 10 percent.28  
The study also found that in terms of Kenyan shilling that “for every one shilling 
earned by the lowest 10 percent, the highest 10 percent earned more than Kshs 56.” 
Additionally, when the income groups are subdivided into ten cumulative percentages of 
household income groups, the gini coefficient, which measures the inequality of income 
distribution, was 0.571.29 
 
 
                           
 
 
2.2.4. Information and Communications Technology 
The rapid growth of information and communications technology (ICT) in Kenya has 
facilitated innovative ways for delivering financial services in addition to changing the 
methods of payment, which has helped with the expansion of microfinance in the 
country. Services such as M-Pesa allow mobile phone users with pre-paid accounts to 
                                                                                                                                                 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 FSD (2007). Financial Access in Kenya: Results of the 2006 National Survey. FinaAccess Study. finaccess. Nairobi, Financial 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya: 44 pages.  
26
 FFP (2006). Kenya's Economic Indicators. Country Profiles, The Fund for Peace.  
27
 WDI (2007). Kenya's  Population Size and Population Distribution, World Bank.  
28
 Odhiambo, W. (2004). Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya. Nairobi, Society for International Development 
(SID): 85 pages.  
29
 Ibid.  
Figure 4: Share of income distribution by household groups 
Source: (Odhiambo 2004) 
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transfer money to anyone within their mobile network.30 For example, customers register 
with Safaricom for an M-Pesa account to activate their mobile phone to turn cash into e-
money at Safaricom authorized dealers; this then would allow customers to use their 
mobile phones in making payments and transferring money to other customers within the 
Safaricom network.31 This has made it possible for MFIs to integrate services such as M-
Pesa into their payment methods and this has in turn enhanced the distribution of 
microfinance loans and the collection of repayments of loans, which has greatly reduced 
the transaction costs.  
 
2.2.5. Mobile Phones 
In terms of mobile phone access in Kenya, 26.9 percent of the population 18 years 
and above own a mobile phone.32 According to FSD Kenya’s 2006 national survey, 52.3 
percent of the urban population owned a mobile phone, while almost half the number, 
about 18.6 percent reported owning a mobile phone in the rural areas. In addition, those 
who reported not owning a mobile phone still had access to one through a family member 
or a friend. The likelihood of using someone else’s mobile phone was much higher in the 
rural areas, where 29 percent were reported compared to 22.8 percent in the urban 
areas.33  
 
 
                  
Access to Mobile Phones in Kenya
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Rural Mobile Phone
Users
Urban Mobile Phone
Users
National Mobile
Phone Users
Rural-Urban Population
Own
Use others
No access
 
 
 
2.2.6. Methods of Payment 
As a result of the rapidly growing ICT sector in Kenya, electronic payment methods 
such as: PesaPoint – an automated teller machine (ATM), Sokotele – a point of sale 
device (POS), cash-in cash-out services, credit cards, and M-Pesa have been gaining 
                                                 
30
 Vodafone. (2007). "Safaricom and Vodafone Launch M-PESA, A New Mobile Payment Service."   Retrieved 10/24, 2007, from 
http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/uploads/2007/02/vodafone-m-pesa-launch-final.pdf.  
31
 Hughes, N. and S. Lonie (2007). "M-PESA: Mobile Money for the “Unbanked” Turning Cellphones into 24-Hour Tellers in Kenya 
in Kenya." Innovations 2(1-2): 14 pages.  
32
 FSD (2007). Financial Access in Kenya: Results of the 2006 National Survey. FinaAccess Study. finaccess. Nairobi, Financial 
Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya: 44 pages.  
33
 Ibid.  
Figure 5: Percentage of rural-urban population with access to mobile phones in Kenya 
Source: (FSD 2007) 
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prominence and most MFIs are hoping to utilize them as the preferred form of payment 
for their microfinance services due to their cost saving nature.34 
According to the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Professor Njuguna 
Ndung’u, the use of ICT solutions such as electronic payment methods has greatly 
benefited microfinance through the reduction of both the high fixed costs associated with 
running branches, mainly in rural areas, and lowering operating costs for MFIs through 
sharing their point of services with other vendors.35  
In addition, the recent CBK microfinance prudential regulation proposals aim to 
further facilitate sharing agreements with non-bank vendors such as retail shops, 
supermarkets, pharmacies, and gas stations, which would improve transaction costs and 
result in increases of microfinance services in Kenya.36 In view of these proposed 
microfinance prudential regulations, if the transaction cost (S) of delivering microfinance 
fell to (S1), the price of microfinance products and services (P) would fall to (P1), 
resulting in an increase in the number of microfinance products and services being sold 
(this assumes a fairly competitive market for microfinance products).37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Investment Climate 
 
 Kenya has had a long history of economic leadership in East Africa and is one of the 
largest and most advanced economies in the region.38 All investors investing in the 
country receive equal treatment and their investment activities are governed under the 
                                                 
34
 Pickens, M. (2007) Moving Beyond Bank Walls: Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Kenya. CGAP - Technology 
Program Volume, 19 pages DOI: November 2007  
35
 Ngung'u, N. (2007). Proposed Microfinance Prudential Regulations. Workshop to Review the Proposed Microfinance Prudential 
Regulations, Kenya School of Monetary Studies, Nairobi, Central Bank of Kenya.  
36
 Ibid.  
37
 Miller, R. L. (2006). Economics Today. Boston, Pearson Addison-Wesley.  
38
 USA.gov (2007). 2007 Investment Climate Statement - Kenya. D. o. State. Washington.  
Figure 6: Supply and demand model of MFI transaction costs 
Source: (Miller 2006) 
Price (P) 
Quantity (Q) 
P 
P1 
Q Q1 
(P) MFI price in the absence 
of ICT and sharing 
agreements 
(P1) MFI price when ICT and 
sharing agreements are present 
Transaction Costs 
S 
S1 
D 
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Investment Promotion Act 2004.39 The law provides the administrative and legal 
procedures to achieve a more effective investment climate.  
 The law sets the following requirement for foreign investors: 
 
 
 The minimum foreign investment threshold at $500,000 
 Investors must receive an investment certificate from Kenya Investment Authority (KIA) 
 Foreign employees are expected to be key senior managers or have special skills not available 
locally 
 Foreign investors are required to sign an agreement with the government stating training 
arrangements for phasing out expatriates 
 Any enterprise, whether local or foreign, may recruit expatriates for any category of skilled labor if 
Kenyans are not available 
 Work permits are required for all foreign nationals wishing to work in the country 
 
 
2.3.1. Business Forms 
 Foreign firms establishing Kenyan subsidiaries usually choose the private limited 
liability company, as the laws regulating their establishment and operation are less 
stringent. There are no restrictions on exit procedures for a branch of a non-resident 
company except that a branch must be registered.40 
 
2.3.2. Business Environment 
According the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 2008, the overall 
business environment in Kenya in terms of doing a business is “relatively well protected 
by Kenya’s regulatory environment.”41 Kenya is ranked 71st out of 178 countries in the 
ease of doing business, where starting a business takes an average of 57 days, compared 
to the world average of 43 days.42 In term of Economic Freedom, Kenya is ranked 82nd 
out of 157, where investment freedom and freedom from government (share of 
government in the economy) received a score of 50 percent and 84.8 percent respectively. 
This has resulting in Kenya receiving a country rating of C (see Annex m).43 
 
2.4. Economic Sector 
 
2.4.1. Employment Sectors 
 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 2005-06 labor force survey found 
that of the 18.8 million Kenyans in the age group 15-64, 13.5 million were actively 
                                                 
39
 GoK (2004). Investment Promotion Act 2004. M. o. Finance. Nairobi, Government Printers: 19 pages.  
40
 Deloitte. (2006). "Kenya Snapshot." International Tax and Business Guides  Retrieved 3/4, 2008, from 
http://www.deloittewebguides.com/index.asp?layout=countrySnapshotDtt&country_id=250000025&rf=0.  
41
 (2008). Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation.  
42
 DBI (2008). Doing Business Index, World Bank.  
43
 Coface (2008). Country Ratings, The Coface Group. 
Table 3: Foreign investments requirements in Kenya 
Source: (USA.gov 2007) 
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participating in the labor force. The population actively participating in the labor force 
can be subdivided into three sectors; agricultural, formal, and the Jua Kali sectors.44  
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2.4.2. Agricultural Sector 
 The 2005-06 labor force survey by KNBS found that “officially” more than 50 
percent of the actively participating labor force in Kenya was employed in the 
agricultural sectors where approximately 6.75 million Kenyans,45 though other 
“unofficial” estimates show a much higher percentage engage in the sector. The 
agricultural sector is where the majority of Kenyans are employed and it plays a 
significant role for rural households.46 
 
2.4.3. Formal Sector 
 According to the survey by KNBS, the formal sector accounts for the smallest share 
of actively participating labor force in the country and represents about 14 percent of total 
employment, which is 1.89 million.47 The formal sector is officially recognized by the 
Government of Kenya (GoK) and those employed pay a tax on the salaries they earn. 
 
2.4.4. The Jua Kali Sector 
 “Jua Kali” means “hot sun” and was once synonymous with people who worked 
long hours under the sun making handicrafts as a means of livelihood. Over time, the 
term Jua Kali has been broadened to include all forms of livelihood (non-agricultural) 
that are not officially registered by GoK to operate in the economy. Hence, Jua Kali 
literally means the informal economy. Further, according to internationally accepted 
                                                 
44
 Pollin, R., M. w. Githinji, et al. (2007). An Employment-Targeted Economic Program for Kenya. Brazilia, UNDP.  
45
 Ibid.  
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 FSD (2007). Financial Access in Kenya: Results of the 2006 National Survey. FinaAccess Study. finaccess. Nairobi, Financial 
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47
 Pollin, R., M. w. Githinji, et al. (2007). An Employment-Targeted Economic Program for Kenya. Brazilia, UNDP.  
Figure 7: Sectors where the labor force is participating 
Source: (Pollin, Githinji et al. 2007) 
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definitions, Jua Kali can also describe self-employment in non-agricultural activities and 
is used as a key indicator for the informal economy.48   
 According to the KNBS, the Jua Kali sector accounts for 36 percent of total 
employment and it employs more than 4.86 million people. A large number of workers in 
the Jua Kali sector work more than 40 hours per week with low pay.49 As per the survey, 
a majority of these people are unable to support themselves and their families.  
 
2.4.5. The Banking System 
The role of the traditional banking institutions in Kenya is to channel funds from 
households, firms, and governments with excess savings to those who have a shortage of 
investable funds.50 Similarly, MFIs provide financial services, primarily savings and 
credit to the poor who do not have access to the traditional banking institutions.51 
The innovative lending strategies of MFIs in providing microcredit and other 
financial services to the poor are often considered a challenge to traditional financial 
institutions.52 Products and services offered by both the traditional financial institutions 
and MFIs in Kenya are similar and include the following: loans, savings and deposit, 
payment services, insurance, money transfer, and non-financial services  
The key difference is the smallness of products and services offered by MFIs. Other 
features that distinguish microfinance services from those provided by the traditional 
financial institutions include the absence of collateral to access services and the 
simplicity of MFI operations that use innovative ICT solutions.53 
 The conventional wisdom is that MFI services are expected to force the traditional 
institutions to pay greater attention to the banking needs of the poor. However, despite 
the presence of the MFI institutions, the traditional banking system in Kenya continues to 
only serve a small proportion of the market, largely ignoring those considered 
“unbankable” such as poor households (see Figure 2). 
 
2.4.6. Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Kenya’s capital market sector has been growing rapidly and has developed into a 
sophisticated financial system, which is ranked 48 out of 131 economies.54 The 2007-
2008 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) ranked the quality of Kenya’s business 
environment 52 out of 131 and the overall business competitiveness was ranked 62. The 
role of the capital markets in Kenya is essential for the financial sectors and they provide 
financing opportunities for enterprises.55 
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Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.  
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50
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Kenya’s capital market under the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) has undergone 
unprecedented growth, with the equity and bond issuance reaching an all time high. The 
NSE currently has 53 companies with equity listings in the Main and Alternative 
Investment Market Segments (MIMS and AIMS). Additionally, there is another listing 
for trading government and corporate bonds and other fixed-income securities (FIMS).56 
The total equity market capitalization of these 53 companies as of July 31 2007 was 
Kshs. 811.23 billion.57 
 
 
   
 
 
 
3. Problem Statement 
 
This paper explores the feasibility on MIFs and attempts to analyze the factors and 
policies that influence the location decision in terms of how they allocate their 
investments. Accordingly, this paper seeks to answer the following policy questions:  
 
3.1. Policy Question 
i. What factors must be in place before an MIF can establish itself in a location and 
what role would it play in promoting the growth of MFIs? Can an MIF sustain itself, 
while offering both financial and social returns on investment to investors? 
ii. Is it necessary and feasible for an MIF to incorporate in Kenya and if so, what are 
some of the factors and policies that would influence the location decision of an MIF?  
 
3.2. Problem Definition 
The growth of MFIs in Kenya has been met with challenges as the pool for funding 
continues to shrink mainly due to limited donor funds and growing competition in the 
microfinance sector in accessing those funds. The resulting financial gap in the country 
                                                 
56
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57
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Figure 8: NSE 20 Share Index and Market Capitalization 
Source:  (NSE 2007) 
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for sustaining microfinance activities has necessitated the need for MFIs to seek 
alternative sources of funding for their growth and financial sustainability. 
 
3.2.1. Why is there a financial gap for sustaining microfinance activities? 
According to the Problem Tree analysis of the microfinance sector in Kenya, the root 
causes that have mainly contributed to the financial gap include the following: weak 
capacity building procedures, lack of performance criteria, weak transparency and 
accountability systems, and weak regulatory framework that have greatly undermined the 
capabilities of MFIs to effectively operate and expand their activities (see Annex a). 
 
Therefore, the limited sources of available capital have greatly undermined the 
capabilities of MFIs in Kenya to expand their microfinance activities. 
 
 
3.3. Stakeholder Analysis 
In addressing the above mentioned financial gap, a stakeholder analysis of the groups 
directly or indirectly involved in the microfinance sector will allow for better 
understanding of their resource needs and their interests. To understand the level of 
involvement relating to strategies for closing the financial gap in Kenya, stakeholders 
will be subdivided according to their power and salience in the Stakeholder Matrix based 
on the following attributes to guide their strategic responses (see Annex b):58 
 
 
Attributes Stakeholders 
Promoters: Stakeholders who attach a high priority to 
the reform policy a priority and whose actions can have 
an impact on the implementation of the policy. 
AMFI, Tier 1 MFIs, Tier 2 MFIs, GoK, MoF, CBK, 
MoTI, FSD, MSE, USAID, DFID, SIDA, WB, IFC, SRI 
Investors/private sector, business community 
Defenders: Stakeholders who attach a high priority to 
the reform policy but whose actions cannot have an 
impact on the implementation of the policy. 
Tier 3 MFIs, KEMCAP, Excluded groups 
Latents: Stakeholders whose actions can affect the 
implementation of the reform policy but who attach a low 
priority to this policy. 
KIA, NSE, SACCOs, KPOSB, Traditional Banks 
Apathetics: Stakeholders whose actions cannot affect 
the implementation of the reform policy and who attach a 
low priority to this policy. 
MoIC, CCK 
 
 
The following are key stakeholders involved directly or indirectly with the provision 
of microfinance services in Kenya: 
 
3.3.1 Primary Stakeholders 
AMFI is interested in building the capacity of MFIs and reducing the inefficiencies in 
delivering microfinance services in the country.59 The prospect of additional sources of 
                                                 
58
 WB. (2008). "Stakeholder Analysis." Public Sector Governance  Retrieved 3/13, 2008, from 
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Therefore, the limited sources of available capital have greatly undermined the capabilities 
of MFIs in Kenya to effectively operate and expand their microfinance activities. 
 
Table 4: Description of stakeholder attributes 
Source: (WB 2001; WB 2008) 
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capital in the microfinance sector would help address some of the challenges facing most 
of the MFIs in their efforts to deliver microfinance services, while sustaining and 
expanding their activities. 
 
Tier 1 MFIs consist of the 3 deposit-taking MFI banks and they mainly rely on deposits 
and savings as their key source of raising capital for the provision of microfinance 
services. They are interested in alternative sources of capital to help meet the growing 
demand for microfinance services. 
 
Tier 2 MFIs consist of the 17 credit only MFIs who rely on loans that they provide at or 
close to market rates as their key source of raising capital for the provision of 
microfinance services. They are interested in alternative sources of capital to grow their 
loan portfolio in order to expand their microfinance activities. 
 
Tier 3 MFIs consist of the 230 smaller MFIs that focus on both microfinance and social 
welfare. They rely on charity and donor support as their key source of raising capital for 
their microfinance activities. They are interested in cheaper access to private capital to 
grow and sustain their programs. 
 
Traditional banks have access to various sources of capital to expand and sustain their 
financial activities, which include deposits and savings and investments services. The 
traditional banks are interested in alternative sources of capital, which can be used to 
grow their portfolio. 
 
Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) such as Savings and Credit Co-Operatives 
(SACCOs) and Kenya Post Office Savings Bank (KPOSB or PostBank) rely on 
mobilizing deposits and savings as their main source of capital for sustaining their 
lending activities. These NBFIs are interested in alternative sources of capital that is 
long-term based, which can enable them to increase their loan portfolio. 
 
Private sector such as social responsible investors (SRIs), are interested in placing their 
investments where they can receive social and financial returns. They are mainly 
concerned with accurate and timely information, which they use to make their financial 
decision as to where to invest their money. 
 
Business community Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) and Small Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) are interested in both investment opportunities and accessing 
additional sources of capital to grow their businesses. These groups are mainly concerned 
with accessing affordable capital that they can use to grow and sustain their business 
activities. 
 
Interest groups such as workers unions and cooperatives are interested in enhancing their 
socio-economic wellbeing through increased access to financial services. These interest 
groups are mainly interested in a wider range of financial products and services to meet 
their financial needs. 
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Excluded groups from the financial sector make up 35.2 percent of Kenyans who are 
unable to access ‘formal’ financial services.60 This group faces challenges in accessing 
affordable financial services are forced to turn to informal financial providers such as 
family, friends, and money lenders, which has greatly hindered their ability to improve 
their socio-economic status. 
 
“Unbankable” groups in Kenya make up 30.2 percent of Kenyans who are unable to 
access any financial services.61 This group faces challenges in accessing basic socio-
economic benefits such as education, healthcare services, land ownership, income 
generating activities, and credit facilities that can help them improve their socio-
economic status.62 
 
3.3.2 Secondary Stakeholders 
Public sector agencies such as CBK, Ministry of Finance (MoF), and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MoTI) are interested in improving the policy environment to 
facilitate the growth and development of business. They are mainly concerned with 
ensuring that access to information and resources are adequate to support the delivery of 
microfinance services in the country. The prospect of attracting investments to the 
microfinance sector through policy would help with the expansion of microfinance in 
Kenya. 
 
Political groups such as Members of Parliament (GoK) are interested in ensuring that 
their constituents have access to economic opportunities through microfinance services. 
They are primarily concerned with the growing population that cannot access basic socio-
economic benefits that could potentially improve their status. 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide social welfare are interested in 
increased access to financial services that could help enhance economic opportunities for 
many Kenyans. They are primarily concerned with affordable access to financial 
services. 
 
Civil society especially those representing the MSEs are mainly interested in increasing 
investment opportunities to help grow and sustain businesses. Other civil society groups 
such as FSD are interested in the growth and development of the financial markets to 
support wealth creation and reduce poverty.63 The civil society is primarily concerned 
with ensuring that the business environment is favorable for both the MSEs and for 
potential investors. 
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3.3.3 External Stakeholders 
International agencies (such as USAID, DFID, SIDA, WB, and IFC) are interested in 
the growth and development of microfinance in Kenya. They are primarily concerned 
with providing the necessary resources (loans, grants, guarantees, and technical 
assistance) that can help MFIs develop and grow their microfinance activities.  
 
Other public sector agencies (such as MoIC and CCK) are interested in providing ICT 
infrastructure that will facilitate the use and growth of technology in the country. These 
public sector agencies are mainly concerned with the efficient use of technology and the 
reduced cost savings in providing services that depend on ICT.  
 
3.3.4. Explanatory Note of Stakeholder Analysis 
According to the stakeholder mapping, quadrants A, B, and D are the vital 
stakeholders in this policy reform and they have significant influence on the policy 
objectives. The summary of each quadrant is as follows: 
 Quadrant A (Defenders): Stakeholders of high importance to the policy reform, 
but with low influence. 
 Quadrant B (Promoters): Stakeholders who have a high degree of influence on 
the policy reform and are critical in the implementation process. 
 Quadrant C (Apathetics): Stakeholders in this quadrant are those with low 
influence on the policy reform and whose interests are not the main target of this 
policy reform. 
 Quadrant D (Latents): Stakeholders with high influence and who can affect the 
outcome of the policy reform, but whose interests is not the main target of this 
policy reform. 
 
 
               
 
Figure 9: Stakeholder mapping 
Source: (see Annex b) 
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3.4. Goals and Objectives 
The goal of this paper is to ensure that a favorable microfinance environment to 
attract investments in Kenya is created. To achieve this above goal and deliver significant 
change in the microfinance sector, the following are recommended objectives: 
 Increase capacity: Improving MFIs operation through continual training of staff and 
through organizational development to help address their capital and management 
constraints in addition to encouraging the growth of their services. The training 
process should encourage the development of professional managers in 
microfinance. 
 Enhance information: Implementing procedures that will enhance accessibility of 
information on MFI activities. This will help ensure accurate information of 
microfinance services to reduce risks and improve performance. 
 Increase performance: Implementing benchmarks for peer group evaluation and 
comparison with industry norms. This will ensure that MFIs are collecting and 
disseminating lessons learned and best practices to improve their overall 
performance. 
 Enhance self-governance: Increasing accountability of MFIs by promoting self-
regulation where MFIs act as checks-and-balances of how microfinance is 
delivered in the country. This will help assess MFIs on how well their social, 
environmental, and financial objectives are balanced and to ensure that MFIs are 
operating under acceptable industry norms. 
 
 
4. Implication of Existing Microfinance Environment 
 
 The following are the outcomes of the existing microfinance environment in Kenya 
that has greatly undermined the capabilities of MFIs in efficiently operating their 
services and in expanding their microfinance activities. The outcomes of the current 
microfinance environment include: self-governance issues, capacity building issues, non-
compliance to reporting requirements, and un-standardized performance criteria. 
 
4.1. Self-governance Issues 
AMFI with its mission of “creating an all inclusive and influential regional network 
of financial institutions that provide quality microfinance services to low income 
people,”64 is a membership organization of MFIs in Kenya that promotes self-governance 
in the provision of microfinance services in the country. Although AMFI recognizes how 
vital microfinance is for the vast majority of Kenyans who lack access to financial 
services,65 it faces challenges in getting MFIs involved with the process of governing 
their delivery of microfinance services in the country. The current membership consists 
of 33 MFIs of the total 250 MFIs in the country (see Annex c).66 The lack of governance 
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criteria has weakened the ability of some of the MFIs to effectively deliver microfinance 
services, which has hindered them from achieving credible levels of accountability thus 
further jeopardizing their sustainability. 
 
4.2. Capacity Building Issues 
Capacity building of MFIs refers to both the financial and non-financial capacity and 
deals with how MFIs manage their resources to effectively deliver microfinance.67 As the 
competition to deliver microfinance services continues to grow and the traditional banks 
venture into microfinance, MFIs face challenges in their outreach activities and 
maintaining their sustainability.68 The outcome of the competition is that as traditional 
banks begin providing microfinance services, MFI staff and clients are being poached by 
these banks, which has weakened both the financial and non-financial capacity of MFIs 
in Kenya.69 
 
 
Financial capacity is the ability of a MFI to absorb and manage increased funds for loan disbursement. 
 
Non-financial capacity is the ability of a MFI to utilize institutional and human resources for skill development, 
information management systems, and networking opportunities with other microfinance service providers. 
 
 
4.3. Non-compliance Reporting Requirements 
The microfinance sector in Kenya has developed and grown in the absence of no 
regulatory oversight and non-compliance with reporting on their activities. Although this 
strategy has been beneficial for MFIs in the transformation stage, it is clear that there are 
some MFIs not operating on a sound basis.70 For example, the growing number of cases 
of pyramid schemes – “the get rich quick deposit taking outfits in which investors have 
lost billions of shillings.”71 The non-compliance with reporting on MFI activities not only 
compromises the sustainability of developing MFIs, it also costs MFIs in terms of 
securing money from private sources since many do not report their activities. 
 
4.4. Un-standardized Performance Criteria 
The lack of appropriate performance criteria in the microfinance sector has led to 
uneven distribution of microfinance services, which is adversely impacting the scaling up 
of microfinance in the country. However, there are efforts underway by AMFI and the 
Kenya Microfinance Capacity Building Program (KEMCAP) to operationalize a 
performance monitoring system for MFIs in order to stimulate the development of the 
sector and provide consistency and accountability for delivery of microfinance.72 
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5. Assessment of Microfinance Investment Funds 
 
Microfinance investment funds are specifically created vehicles which have been set 
up to invest in microfinance assets and in which social or commercial, private or 
institutional investors can potentially invest their capital.73 These vehicles allow for the 
pooling of investor capital that is made available for lending to MFIs, generating benefits 
to investors when they are repaid. 
 
                                            
                  
 
 
5.1. Range of MIF Investors 
According to Patrick Goodman’s presentation at the 2004 Financial Sector 
Development Symposium in Berlin, the main types of MIFs investors fall under the 
following four categories; private donors, development agencies, private individuals, and 
institutional investors (see Annex i).74 These investors use a variety of lending 
instruments such as grants, subsidized loans, loans at or close to market rates, equity 
participation, guarantees, and technical assistance (TA) as means of supporting the 
microfinance sector. These investors include the following: 
 
 
                 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Matthäus-Maier, I., J. D. Von Pischke, et al. (2006). Microfinance investment funds : leveraging private capital for economic 
growth and poverty reduction. Berlin ; New York; Frankfurt, Germany, Springer ; KfW Entwicklungsbank.  
74
 Ibid.  
Figure 11: Range of MIF investors and their lending instruments 
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Figure 10: Structure of vehicles that channeling capital 
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Private Donors such as Foundations and NGOs usually support microfinance sectors 
through providing lending that is much closer to the market interest rate. Sometimes they 
provide subsidized lending at little or no interest rate. 
 
Development Agencies such as the bilateral and multilateral agencies usually support 
microfinance sectors through providing lending instruments that are similar to private 
donors and additional they take equity stakes in their investments. 
 
Private Individuals such as shareholders usually support microfinance sectors through 
participating in social investments instruments products such as loan instruments or 
taking equity stakes in their financial investments. 
 
Institutional Investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, mutual and 
investment funds usually support microfinance sectors by investing their asset portfolios 
in microfinance or by setting up their own dedicated investment funds that provides 
lending instruments such as loans and equity stakes. 
  
5.2. Categories of MIFs 
In order to distinguish the categories of MIFs that are available for microfinance, 
MIFs are subdivided on the basis of their objective. This includes subdividing MIFs 
based on their balance between financial objectives and social objectives, types of 
investors involved, terms offered, and the MFIs that are primarily targeted. This can be 
subdivided into three categories: commercial, commercially oriented, and development 
funds.75 
 
Commercial Microfinance Investment Funds mainly target private and institutional 
investors and the funds have a well defined objective, which is distributed through 
memoranda, prospectuses, and annual reports that allow investors to compare their 
investments with others.76 These types of funds are generally profit driven. 
 
Commercially Oriented Microfinance Investment Funds mainly target private donors, 
development agencies, private and institutional investors and the funds have a well-
defined objective, which is similarly distributed as in the case of commercial 
microfinance investment funds. This type of fund has a financial objective, but is not 
necessarily profit driven.77 
 
Microfinance Development Funds mainly target private donors and development 
agencies and the fund mainly aims to provide capital to MFIs to support their 
development without necessarily seeking a financial return. Investors do not require 
documentation such as the other two categories and they mainly seek to maintain their 
                                                 
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Ibid.  
77
 Ibid.  
 26 
original capital, which is achieved by providing subsidized loans or loans at below 
market rates.78 
 
5.3. Financial Sources of MIFs 
According to a 2004 survey conducted by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) and Appui au développement autonome (ADA) on microfinance investors 
around the world, close to 79 percent of all capital that goes to financing MFIs is 
dominated by socially motivated public funding consisting of government sponsored 
agencies such as the international financial institutions (IFIs). The remaining 21 percent 
is from other private capital sources mainly consisting of the private and institutional 
investors.79  
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Although grants are not included in the above sources of financing for MIFs, it is 
estimated that bilateral and multilateral donors and private foundations to MIFs 
contribute approximately $500 million to $1 billion in grants each year.80 
Despite IFIs dominating the global capital in microfinance, their investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa is small representing about 6 percent of the global share. Further, the 
CGAP and ADA survey also found that the amounts that IFIs provide in terms of lending 
instruments (debt, equity, and guarantees) to Sub-Saharan Africa represents 26 percent 
while private capital represents 74 percent, which was the largest source of MIF 
financing.81 
 
 
Private Capital IFIs All Investors 
Debt Equity  Guarantees Debt Equity  Guarantees Total 
$30,000,000 $15,000,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $6,000,000 $8,000,000 $62,000,000 
48% 24% 2% 3% 10% 13% 100% 
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Figure 12: Share of MIF financing (2004) 
Table 6: Amount of MIF financing in 2004 (in millions)  
Source: (Matthäus-Maier, Von Pischke et al. 2006)  
Source: (Matthäus-Maier, Von Pischke et al. 2006)  
Source: (Matthäus-Maier, Von Pischke et al. 2006)  
Table 7: Amount of MIF financing to Sub-Saharan Africa (in millions)  
 27 
5.4. Portfolio of MIFs Invested in Africa 
In 2007, there are more than 45 microfinance investment funds that either allocate 
their investments directly or indirectly to MFIs in Africa. Accordingly, of the 45MIFs, 4 
are incorporated in Africa (of which 2 are based there: AfriCap – Mauritius and KEF – 
South Africa) and the remaining 41 are incorporated outside the continent.82 These funds 
are well diversified across the various lending instruments, which provide different 
opportunities for investors.83 
These MIFs range in their total assets where a majority (89.8 percent) operates above 
the conventionally accepted sustainable size of having microfinance portfolios of at least 
$20 million.84 According to the MIX market, of the 45 MIFs that reported investing in 
Africa, only 38 MIFs reported their total asset and the share of fund allocation. The total 
assets of the 38 MIFs were approximately $1.7 billion and they were invested in 1506 
microfinance institutions (see Annex j).85 
 
 
Size of MIF  
(total asset) Fund Assets  
% of 
Size 
Number of 
Active MF 
Investments 
Number of 
Active MF 
Investments 
in Africa 
% of 
MIFs 
$0 - $5million $21,208,072 1.23% 80 16 5.31% 
$5m - $10million $21,468,391 1.24% 36 4 2.39% 
$10m - $20million $134,986,262 7.83% 218 42 14.48% 
Greater than 
$20million $1,546,900,959 89.70% 1172 108 77.82% 
TOTAL $1,724,563,684 100% 1506 170 100% 
 
 
Further, the sizes of these 38 MIFs are projected to grow to $0.36 billion in 2008, 
which represents a 21.15 percentage change of the total fund assets. Additionally, the 
microfinance portfolios of those whose asset size is below $5 million will experience the 
largest percentage change in their assets of about 94 percent. On the other hand, those 
MIFs whose total asset size is greater than $20 million will experience the least 
percentage change of about 19 percent.86 
 
 
Size of MIF  
(total asset) 
 
Fund Assets 
  (2007) 
 
Projected new Funds 
allocated to MF 
Investments (1year) 
Projected 
Fund Assets 
 
% change of  
Fund Assets 
 
$0 - $5million $21,208,072 $19,927,230 $41,135,302 93.96% 
$5m - $10million $21,468,391 $5,000,000 $26,468,391 23.29% 
$10m - $20million $134,986,262 $44,005,632 $178,991,894 32.60% 
Greater than $20m $1,546,900,959 $295,800,305 $1,842,701,264 19.12% 
TOTAL $1,724,563,684 $364,733,167 $2,089,296,851 21.15% 
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Table 8: Total assets and the size of microfinance portfolios of 38 MIFs invested in Africa (2007) 
Source: (MIX 2008) 
Table 9: Percentage change of total assets of the 38 MIFs invested in Africa (2007) 
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In terms of distribution of where the 45 MIFs are invested, 22 percent are commercial 
funds and their asset size is $0.53 billion. 14 percent are commercially oriented and their 
asset size is $0.26 billion. 8 percent of the investment has a mix of both commercially 
orientation and development aspects and their asset size is about $0.05 billion. The 
largest share, 56 percent are development funds and their asset size are about $0.86 
billion.87 
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However, of the 45 MIFs, it is estimated that less than 12 percent are invested in 
MIFs in Africa. According to the data from the Mix Market, of the MIFs investing in 
Africa; 1.1 percent are commercial funds, 2.2 percent are commercially oriented, 1 
percent has a mix of both commercially oriented and development funds, and the largest 
share of funds are the development funds which represents 7.7 percent of the total assets 
invested in Africa. 
Although a large share of the MIFs invested in Africa are development funds, there is 
a growing distribution of MIFs such as the commercial and commercially oriented that 
are becoming more attractive to private individuals and institutional investors, which are 
helping to provide alternative financing for microfinance.88 
 
5.5. Social Responsible Investments 
The Social Investment Forum defines social responsible investments (SRI) as an 
“investment process that considers the social and environmental consequences of 
investments during financial analysis.”89 Accordingly, socially responsible investors rank 
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 Ibid.  
88
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Figure 13: Distribution of MIF activities 
Source: (MIX 2008) 
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SRIs high when they make financial decisions on where to place their investments and 
this trend has been growing rapidly, especially in the US and Europe.90  
A 2007 study by Deutsche Bank found that in the US, more than 10 percent of assets 
are related to SRI and that in Europe SRI has grown by 27.3 percent since 2003.91 As SRI 
continues to grow, microfinance is likely to benefit as social investors pursue more 
investments that are social and environmental friendly.  
The challenge then is to attract MIFs that either allocates a larger share of their 
investments in Africa or to incorporate in Africa. Among the 45 MIFs profiled, the 
largest MIFs are either incorporated in the US or in Europe, where 69 percent are US 
based, 27 percent are European, are the remaining 4 percent are African based.92  
 
 
 
6. Analysis of Factors Supporting Location Decision of MIFs 
 
The success and rapid growth of microfinance in many developing countries in terms 
of the increasing MFI loan volumes and emerging professionalism of the sector, has 
raised its investment profile. Microfinance has traditionally been funded by donor 
organizations, but their shrinking financial ability to support MFIs has led to a financial 
gap that private capital has begun fill (see Figure 12).93 
As private capital continues to grow, MIFs will have to play a much greater role in 
attracting and leveraging private capital to achieve an optimal level for their viability and 
eventually for their success.94 The following factors have contributed to the success of 
MIFs: 
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Figure 14: Country of incorporation for MIFs in Africa 
Source: (MIX 2008) 
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Country Risk refers to “a collection of risks associated with investing in a foreign 
country.”95 In terms of investments, the risks involved with investing in a foreign country 
include political risk, currency risk, credit risk, operation risk, and liquidity risk, which 
could impact the growth and performance of MIFs.96 
 
Corporate Governance in the context of investments, it refers to the “overall mode of 
ruling an organization to ensure that systems and structures are in place to provide 
conformity with the reasonable expectations of a relevant interest group of shareholders 
and possibly other stakeholders.” This mainly deals with the supervision of management 
operation of MFIs and ensuring that implementation of the main mission is adhered to on 
behalf of the investors.97  
 
Business Environment refers to an “administrative and economic environment that is 
favorable to businesses and facilitates private sector development.”98 This is an 
environment that strengthens the state of the business community by ensuring that there 
is increased transparency on the decisions affecting the private sector. According to the 
World Bank’s Doing Business index (DBI), decisions affecting the private sector depend 
on the relative ease of doing business in a country, which covers the following three 
areas: starting a business, business liabilities, and investor protection.99 
 
Access to Capital Markets is integral for the growth of MIFs. Capital markets allow 
MIFs to diversify risks in addition to accessing domestic capital. This helps lower both 
the operational and monitoring costs when trying to convert currencies, which reduces 
inherent exchange rate risks associated with currency conversions.100 
 
6.1. Case Analysis of MIFs in Africa 
In an attempt to understand the location decision of the various MIFs that invest in 
Africa, I will conduct a case analysis of those countries where MIFs are distributed.  
According to the analysis of the profiled 45 MIFs, a vast majority is either 
incorporated in the US or Europe and a few are incorporated in Africa (namely South 
Africa and Mauritius). The following are some of the observations on MIF investments: 
 
6.1.1. Country Risk Analysis 
According to the Coface Group, who mainly monitor country trends for investment 
opportunities, Mauritius and South Africa received a country rating of A3 and are both 
globally ranked 18th and 57th respectively out of 157 countries.101  
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This analysis found that investors preferred to invest in countries that received 
reasonable ratings from agencies that assessing country risks (see Annex m).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of freedom from government, which looks at the size of government in the 
economy (total government expenditure), Mauritius has a score of 81.4 percent where 
government spending as a percentage of GDP is 24.9 percent, whereas, South Africa has 
a score of 76.8 percent and government spending is 27.8 percent of GDP (see Figure 
15).102  
This analysis found that the more active the government was in the domestic 
economy in terms of operating state owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government 
projects that compete directly with the private sector, there was a high likelihood that 
private investors would stay away since they could not compete.103  
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In Figure 15, both Mauritius and South Africa score above the world average in terms 
of freedom from corruption. According to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption 
Perceptions Index for 2007, Mauritius is one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and is 
ranked 53rd out of 179 countries (ranked 3rd in Africa). In Mauritius, “corruption is not 
                                                 
102
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103
 Sidak, G. and D. E. M. Sappington (2002) Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises. American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research (AEI) Volume,  DOI: December 3, 2002  
Rating A3: A country rating of A3 indicates that changes in the country’s environment are generally good. 
There may be some volatility in the political and economic environment, which could potentially affect 
corporate payment behavior. The business environment is secure with occasional difficulties for business in 
terms of default rates. 
 
Figure 15: Government participation and corruption perceptions  
Table 10: Description of Coface country rating 
Source: (2008) 
Source: (Coface 2008) 
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seen as an obstacle to foreign direct investment.” On the other hand, although South 
Africa scores higher in the 2007 CPI, corruption is perceived as a significant impediment 
to foreign direct investment and is globally ranked 43rd (ranked 2nd in Africa).104  
This analysis found that while corruption may be prevalent in a country, investors 
were mainly concerned with the corruption in government functions since this is where 
they would be most impacted. For example, initiatives that requires foreigners to co-
partner with local investors, may hinder investors from investing freely or compromise 
investments due to ‘functional’ corruption of paying bribes to get things done.105 
 
6.1.2. Corporate Governance Analysis 
According to the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 2008, foreign 
and domestic capital in Mauritius is treated equally and there is a well defined foreign 
investment code that allows investors to freely invest. In Figure 16, Mauritius has a 
investment freedom score of 70 percent, which is much higher than the world average of 
50 percent. 
In terms of investment freedom in South Africa, investors can freely participate in 
their economy though policies such as the Black Economic Empowerment program 
(BEE)106 that aim to increase black ownership in economic activities and other labor laws 
have created disincentives for some investors. As a result, South Africa received a 50 
percent score. 
As for protecting investors against misuse of corporate assets,107 both Mauritius and 
South Africa perform much better than the national average in OECD and Sub-Saharan 
countries.108 In Figure 17, the corporate governance systems for Mauritius and South 
Africa score high, this has helped to enhance the overall investment climate of these 
countries, which has allowed for better interaction between the management of MIFs and 
its shareholders. Further, strong corporate governance has helped “ensure that all the 
financial stakeholders are able to receive their fair share of the company’s earnings and 
assets.”109  
This analysis found that if the “overall mode of ruling an organization” was mainly 
driven by the government with little or no private sector participation, the integrity of 
investments can be compromised and it could potentially create a disincentive for private 
sector involvement, which could further jeopardize systems and structures that enhance 
corporate governance and attract investors. In addition, the protection of investors is 
important and appears to have a positive relation with the levels of investments. 
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6.1.3. Business Environment Analysis 
In terms of overcoming the legal hurdles of starting a business, Mauritius and South 
Africa, are ranked 27th and 35th globally. When compared to other African countries, they 
are ranked 1st and 2nd respectively (see Annex n).110 
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In Figure 18, the number of procedures for getting a business started for both 
Mauritius and South Africa are similar to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and are well below the Sub-Saharan Africa average. 
In Mauritius, it takes 6 procedures to get a business started, while in South Africa, it takes 
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Figure 18: Legal hurdles in incorporating and registering a new business 
Source: (DBI 2008) 
Figure 16: Analysis of investment freedom 
Source: (2008) 
Figure 17: Protecting investors against misuse of corporate assets 
Source: (DBI 2008)    
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8. The OECD average number of procedures for starting a business is 6 while in Sub-
Saharan Africa it’s 10.8.111 
This analysis found that the legal hurdles that business face when starting up and the 
liabilities they incur are significant when investors are determining their investment 
decisions. Accordingly, there is a positive relationship between investments flows and the 
business environment (in terms of procedures required to obtain a business registration, 
number of days it takes to start, and the cost of starting the business). 
 
6.1.4. Capital Market Analysis 
South Africa has the largest capital market in Africa and in terms of global financial 
market sophistication is ranked 25th out of 131 capital markets in the world, which 
represents a score of 5.19.112 Mauritius’ financial market sophistication is ranked 32nd, 
which represents a score of 5.05 (see Figure 19). When compared to other African 
countries, they are ranked 1st and 2nd respectively. 
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This analysis found that access to domestic markets plays a significant role in 
attracting investments since they provide alternative financing opportunities, especially 
for investors who are trying to mitigate exchange rate risks. Hence, access to domestic 
markets provides financing opportunities in local currencies and there is a positive 
relationship between the financial market sophistication and investment flows.113   
      
6.2. Implication of Analysis 
The implication of the case analysis of MIFs investing in Africa found that; (1) a 
country’s risk rating, (2) the corporate governance systems that protect investments, (3) 
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Figure 19: Financial market sophistication 
 35 
the administrative and economic environment that businesses operate under, and (4) the 
ease of accessing domestic capital markets plays an integral role in determining where 
investors choose to place their investments. 
The major findings of the case analysis are that a favorable business environment is 
needed to attract investments. Accordingly, the following are the summaries from the 
analysis of MIFs in Africa: 
  There is an inverse relationship between the government’s involvement in the 
economy and levels of investment: The share of government activity in the 
economy as a share of GDP may crowd-out private investment activity. 
According to the crowding out theory, government spending that competes with 
the private sector inherently causes the cost of private investment to increase.114 
  There is an inverse relationship between ‘functional’115 corruption and the levels 
of investments: The levels of corruption, which is measured by TI’s Corruption 
Perception Index are not seen as an obstacle to foreign investments as much as 
bureaucratic procedures. 
  There is an inverse relationship between government regulation and the levels of 
investment: Government regulation, which is measured by Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom plays a significant role in determining foreign 
investment. Accordingly, the more a government dictates how businesses should 
operate, the lower the investment levels. However, a stronger government 
regulation is preferred when it is specifically targeted to enhance certain processes 
and procedures, which have had positive outcomes especially where there is 
strong public-private partnership. For example, Mauritius has adopted liberal 
investment policies that allow investors to invest freely in their economy, which 
contributed to high inflows of capital into the country. 
  There is a positive relationship between business environment and the levels of 
investments: The administrative environment and the inherent cost of operating a 
business is important for investment, which investors use to base their investment 
decisions since it would ultimately affect their expected return.116  
 There is a positive relationship between the sophistication of financial markets and 
the levels of investments: The role of capital markets are essential for the viability 
of financial sectors and is instrumental for accessing finances. Hence, the ease of 
accessing domestic capital markets has a positive relationship with the levels of 
inflows of capital.  
As a consequence, the policy implication for a country trying to attract MIF 
investments is to ensure that they have a favorable business environment, where the 
government does not crowd out investors and corporate governance systems are in place 
to mitigate potential investment risks. This would help build the value of investments in 
the country. 
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7. Policy Alternatives 
 
7.1. Evaluation Criteria 
The following evaluation criteria provide stakeholders with essential information for 
the analysis of the policy alternatives and in selecting the preferred policy. 
 Efficiency: The policy should enable MFIs to effectively absorb and utilize their 
financial and non-financial resources to economically deliver microfinance 
services. 
 Financial feasibility: The policy should be cost-effective and affordable for MFIs to 
adopt and implement in their day-to-day operations. 
 Political feasibility: The policy should be agreeable to all the stakeholders and 
should generate mutual consensus. 
 Accessibility: The policy should promote the ease of accessing microfinance 
service, while promoting microfinance delivery. 
 
7.2. Description of Alternatives 
The following describe the alternatives that can assist with achieving the goal of 
ensuring a favorable microfinance environment in Kenya, which include: (i) Status Quo, 
(ii) Government Regulation, and (iii) Self Regulation. To determine whether the 
proposed alternative fulfills the goal, each alternative is evaluated on how it will 
accomplish the following objectives: increase capacity, enhance information, increase 
performance, and enhance self-governance. 
The following alternative strategies outlined provide opportunities to channel 
additional sources of funding to microfinance. 
 
Policy Alternative 1: Status Quo 
Alternative 1 consists of guidelines for the provision of microfinance in Kenya and 
only applies to deposit-taking MFIs. The policy establishes some restrictions on MFIs 
banks that includes requirement for licensing, governance, deposit protection, and 
government supervision. Under this policy alternative, non deposit-taking would not be 
subject to the above terms and conditions and the favorable microfinance environment 
described would not occur. A status quo policy assumes that the future growth and 
development of microfinance would comply with existing policy environment. 
 
Analysis of Status Quo 
Pursuing the status quo policy option would limit the growth and development of 
microfinance in the country and would further exacerbate the financial gap challenging 
Kenyans in accessing basic socio-economic opportunities that could help improve their 
livelihoods and socio-economic status. This policy option would also limit investment 
opportunities for smaller MFIs, which would weaken their ability to expand and deliver 
microfinance services. 
Although the status quo policy is both politically and financially feasible, it does not 
promote the efficient delivery of microfinance services and resources; in addition, access 
to microfinance services will continue to be a challenge. Hence, selecting to maintain the 
“status quo” policy is failure to deliver financial resources to expand microfinance and to 
provide economic opportunities to Kenyans. 
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Policy Alternative 2: Government regulation 
Alternative 2 consists of rules for the provision and delivery of microfinance in 
Kenya and it applies to all MFIs. The policy establishes restrictions that include 
requirements for capacity building, accessibility of information, performance criteria, and 
governance structure. Under this policy alternative, all MFIs would be subject to the 
above terms and conditions to ensure that the envisioned microfinance environment 
occurs. A government regulation policy assumes that the future growth and development 
of microfinance would comply with government requirements on MFIs that would be 
supervised by the Central Bank. 
 
Analysis of Government regulation 
Pursuing a government regulation policy for all MFIs in Kenya would help address 
some of the current issues in the microfinance sector; issues in self-regulation, capacity 
building, non-compliance reporting, and performance standards. This would enhance the 
sector and raise the quality of MFI services, in addition to helping with the growth and 
development of microfinance in the country. This policy would help with improving the 
investment prospects by mitigating some of the inherent risks involved with investing. 
For example, some of the challenges identified in the microfinance sector such as poor 
information systems, weak transparency and accountability procedures, and appropriate 
evaluation procedures to benchmark against acceptable industry norms, can be addressed 
through the government’s legislative ability to enforce rules (see Annex e). 
Although the lack of a regulatory framework (except for the deposit-taking MFIs) has 
been crucial for the growth and development of microfinance in Kenya, a government 
regulation policy would weaken those MFIs in the developing stage of their operations or 
may lead to their collapse. While this policy offers a better opportunity for improving 
efficiency of microfinance provision, politically and financially it may not be feasible, 
especially for those MFIs that could not afford to comply.  
In the short term, the cost of conforming to a government regulation may outweigh 
the benefits for some of the MFIs, but the long term benefits of an improved 
microfinance sector that efficiently delivers services outweighs the short term impact. For 
example, if the policy is properly implemented and specifically targets the challenges 
identified in the problem tree analysis, in the short term, many MFIs would be forced to 
close their doors (especially rogue outfits), however, as the sector starts to operate 
effectively more investments may start pouring in, which would help increase the sources 
of available capital for MFIs to efficiently run their operations, in addition to providing 
capital to expand their activities.   
While this policy offers a promising future for microfinance in Kenya, it may not be 
agreeable to all stakeholders, since it would impact their bottom-line, while for others, it 
may not be affordable to conform to the policy. 
 
Policy Alternative 3: Self-regulation 
  Alternative 3 consists of guidelines for the provision and delivery of microfinance in 
Kenya and are voluntarily for MFIs. The policy establishes structural arrangements for 
MFIs that include requirements for capacity building, accessibility of information, 
performance criteria, and governance structure. Under this policy alternative, MFIs 
members would be subject to the above terms and conditions to ensure that the 
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envisioned microfinance environment occurs. A self-regulation policy assumes that the 
future growth and development of microfinance would comply with voluntarily 
requirements, which is self managed by member MFIs. 
 
Analysis of Self-regulation 
Pursuing a self-regulation policy offers enormous benefits for individual MFIs since 
decision-making is done by consensus among the MFIs, including setting their own 
standards. This policy option is voluntarily and gives MFIs a lot of flexibility in 
determining their administration and level of operation. Self-regulation allows MFIs to 
improve their efficiency in delivery microfinance services in a cost-benefit manner 
without constant interference from the government, which would allow MFIs to focus 
more on their core activities. 
While self-regulation seems viable for MFIs wanting to grow and development 
without interference, it has been challenging for smaller MFIs. Self-regulation is 
vulnerable to elite capture if not applied well and smaller MFIs feel dwarfed and are not 
actively involved in the decision making process (which has been the key challenge why 
many MFIs have not joined AMFI). 
In terms of the evaluation criteria, self-regulation has a lot to offer in the areas of 
developing microfinance professional and enhancing the performance of MFIs in meeting 
their objectives – balancing social and financial needs (see Annex e).  
Compared to a government regulation policy, self-regulation has great potential to 
guide the development and growth of microfinance in Kenya. However, since the 
inception of AMFI in 1999, there have been challenges in getting MFIs involved in the 
process. Additionally, in terms of the environment needed to attract investors, a self-
regulation policy may face some resistance in getting MFIs to voluntarily conform to 
agreed rules.  
 
7.3. Preferred Policy Alternative 
The preferred policy alternative should consist of rules and framework for the 
provision and delivery of microfinance in Kenya and it should apply to all MFIs. The 
preferred policy should establish rules to guide MFIs operation, in addition to providing 
the framework for microfinance delivery. The rules and framework should include 
requirements for capacity building, accessibility of information, performance criteria, and 
governance structure. 
Based on the evaluation criteria, a combination of policy alternative 2 and 3 – 
(government regulation and self-Regulation policies) is the best policy option for closing 
the financial gap facing MFIs in the country and for providing the greatest opportunity 
for the growth and development of microfinance in Kenya (see Figure 20). 
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In terms of achieving the goal of ensuring that there is a favorable microfinance 
environment in Kenya to attract investments, a combination of policy option 2 and 3 has 
the following to offer: 
  Enhancing information: The growth and development of ICT in Kenya has 
facilitated the ease of accessing information and services such as microfinance. 
While it is true that ICT has greatly enabled accessing financial services, it is not 
always the case. The growing number of people losing their lifesavings to 
fraudulent operators has been on the rise due to the lack of information on their 
activities, in addition to those who cannot access ‘formal’ financial services in 
spite of the availability of advanced technologies. This has also been a challenge 
even for investor willing to invest in the sector since there is no information of 
their microfinance activities. A government regulation policy would be most 
effective in weeding out rogue operators and in ensuring that information is 
available to guide both consumers and investors in their investment decisions. As 
seen in Figure 20, targeting policies to enhance the process and procedures of 
information distribution has a positive relationship with the levels of investments. 
  Performance: The 2007 global recognition that the microfinance sector in Kenya 
received at the G8 summit is a considerable milestone, which highlights the 
sector’s effort in delivering financial services in the country. Though this is true 
for some of the MFIs, a vast majority may not be achieving acceptable industry 
norms of delivering microfinance services. This has compromised the integrity of 
the sector, where MFI objectives may not be aligned with what is considered 
“acceptable microfinance practices”117 yet benefiting under the microfinance 
environment. A government regulation policy requiring MFIs to report on their 
activities would increase transparency and accountability in microfinance, while a 
self-regulation policy would be more effective in ensuring that MFI’s are 
balancing their objectives according to industry norms (see Annex e). 
  Self-governance: The cost of enforcing a stand-alone government regulation 
would be extremely high and may strain government resources. Although AMFI 
                                                 
117
 “Acceptable microfinance practices” is where MFIs are operating or progressing their activities by optimally balancing their 
objectives (social, environmental, and financial), without compromising their mission.  
Source: (see Annex e) 
Figure 20: Benefits of policy alternatives 
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has been unsuccessful in self-regulating the microfinance sector, a government 
regulation that provides support to AMFI would enhance the checks-and-balances 
of MFIs. It would also give AMFI some legitimacy, which would encourage more 
MFI to partake in the process of self-governance of the microfinance sector, 
would further enhance the performance and transparency of MFIs in the country. 
Additionally, a government regulation that specifically targets the promotion of 
self-governance would help reduce the inherent cost associated with enforcement, 
while at the same time, it would help minimize constraints that discourage 
microfinance development. For example, the growing numbers of “known” 
microfinance operators who are taking advantage of consumers are usually well-
known to MFIs and a government regulation that supports self-governance would 
encourage MFIs to report such activities, which would provide a checks-and-
balance on how MFIs operate. 
 
 
7.4. Implementation Strategy 
MIFs present opportunities for the continued growth and development of the 
microfinance sector in Kenya. They allow for alternative sources of funding to be 
channeled into MFIs, which is essential for closing the financial gap and helping with the 
expansion and delivery of microfinance services in the country.  
Because of the great benefit that MIFs offer and their far reaching impact in aiding 
the economic growth goals of the country, this implementation strategy will deal with 
issues of self-governance, capacity building, non-compliance reporting requirements, and 
un-standardized performance criteria in the microfinance sector (see Annex h). 
The implementation strategy sets out five strategic objectives for addressing the 
challenges facing MFIs, which include capacity building, accessibility, transparency, 
performance, and professional management. Each objective describes the effort that will 
be carried out by MFIs and other stakeholders to ensure its successful implementation. 
The implementation strategy makes a commitment to the agreed strategic objectives 
that provides a framework for all stakeholders to engage in through assigned 
responsibilities as described below.  
 
Capacity building: As a first step towards implementing the preferred policy option, all 
the stakeholders involved in the microfinance sector (those who can affect or be affected) 
should meet and agree on capacity requirements needed to effectively deliver 
microfinance activities. AMFI and KEMCAP will be responsible for coordinating the 
capacity building efforts to strengthen microfinance activities and ensuring they are able 
to achieve sustainability. This should start immediately the preferred policy option has 
been adopted. For the first 3 months, capacity-building sessions should be conducted on a 
weekly basis to ensure that all stakeholders are adequately prepared for the 
implementation process, in addition to acquiring the necessary skills for efficient and 
effective provision of microfinance services in the country. After the initial 3 months, 
capacity building should be done on an ongoing basis with at least 1 capacity building 
session scheduled annually. 
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Accessibility: Ensuring the administrative and economic environment for businesses to 
operate is integral for the sustainability of the preferred policy option. Easily accessible 
and affordable sources of funding should be made available through government policies. 
Accordingly, a consultative group meeting of all stakeholders along with representatives 
from KIA, CBK and MoF should be convened to work on the ways of reducing the cost 
of doing business in the country. KIA and AMFI should coordinate this effort and it 
should start after the capacity building process. This would allow enough time for all 
stakeholders to understand the challenges facing the sector and the alternative options 
available for resolving them.  
 
Transparency: Developing a transparent framework for the microfinance industry should 
focus on standardizing the reporting requirements that can help improve the 
accountability of MFIs. Standardizing the operation procedures and accounting standards 
of MFIs would promote efficiency of microfinance delivery and it would also help create 
a more effective microfinance environment over the long-term that provides quality 
microfinance services. This should be coordinated by AMFI. 
 
Performance criteria: Similar to transparency, performance guidelines should be put in 
place and it should be similar across the board for all MFIs. Standardizing the 
performance criteria for MFIs will contribute to raising the quality and efficiency of 
microfinance delivery in the country. Additionally, having a standardized performance 
criterion would provide confidence in the microfinance sector, especially in terms of 
attracting greater investment opportunities. Immediately following the capacity building 
process, AMFI should help setup and coordinate a working group of selected members 
from the stakeholder list to work on a performance guideline for institutions delivering 
microfinance and to submit it before the stakeholders within 6 months of the working 
group’s inception. The working group’s recommendations with the mutual agreement 
from the stakeholders should be immediately adopted and implemented within a 1-year 
time frame. 
 
Professional management: AMFI and KEMCAP should create programs for capacity 
building with an emphasis on developing experts that would help with ensuring that 
microfinance resources are efficiently used in meeting their intended goal. All 
stakeholders should work on developing management guidelines that will promote 
professionalism and strengthen MFIs’ ability to compete in the ever-changing 
microfinance environment. This should be coordinate by AMFI along with selected 
representatives from the represented MFIs. Developing a professional management 
process should be integrated with the capacity building process, in addition to 
incorporating it with the ongoing discussions of the working group looking at the 
performance guidelines for the microfinance sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
7.5. Monitoring and Evaluation 
All the stakeholders should agree on a performance-based evaluation criterion. 
Benchmarking with industry best practices such as the DBI and Rating Fund118 should be 
developed to follow up with the implementation strategy. The monitoring and evaluation 
should entail regular follow ups and consistently publishing microfinance information to 
ensure challenges with the preferred policy option are being addressed appropriately and 
modified where possible. This would help ensure higher efficiency as the policy is 
implemented.  
 
 
8. Policy Implication 
 
While the preferred policy option offers MFIs with efficient and effective 
opportunities for delivering microfinance services in the country, it also offers GoK an 
opportunity in freeing up resources that could go towards other development projects that 
are important for the socio-economic goals of the country. 
On the issue of key benefits that the preferred policy option has to offer to both the 
MFIs in the country and to MIFs is shown in Table 10 (see Annex f). 
 
 
 
Benefits to MFIs Benefits to MIFs 
Well regulated environment 
Enhanced administrative efficiency of MFIs in delivering 
microfinance  
Access to a variety of investors/capital sources 
Reduced operation costs of providing microfinance services 
Ease of expanding service delivery due to better profit 
margins 
Improved professional management and performance of 
MFIs and microfinance resources 
Increased transparency and accountability MFIs  
Access to technical assistance for industry experts 
Increased investment fund portfolio size in both assets and profits 
Increased flexibility to respond to capital needs of MFIs 
Access to adequate sources of capital 
Enhanced social performance through increasing outreach 
activities in the country that reach a larger number of 
microfinance clients and reaching the segment of the population 
not served by financial services 
Reduced operational risks in their lending activities through 
increased transparency and accountability of MFIs 
Increased MFIs as potential investment opportunities, while 
reducing their risks 
Effective governance of investment funds as a consequence of a 
stable and business friendly environment 
 
 
While all three policy alternatives (status quo, government regulation,  and self-
regulation) offer both MFIs and MIFs benefits, only the preferred option provides 
enormous benefits to not only the MFIs and MIFs, but also to the government (see Annex h). 
 
 
 
                                                 
118
 The Rating Fund aims to encourage greater demand from MFIs services, strengthen the quality of supply, as well as improve 
transparency of MFI’s financial performance (http://www.ratingfund.org/)  
Table 11: Description of the benefits for the preferred policy option 
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9. Conclusion 
 
To ensure that the preferred policy option sustains itself continued efforts by AMFI in 
organizing public awareness events, conferences, and forums to reinforce the benefits of 
implementing and adopting the policy should be done on an ongoing basis to ensure that 
its efforts are not compromised and that all stakeholders are engaged with the process and 
are fully committed. 
The following are recommendations to ensure that the goal of having a favorable 
microfinance environment in Kenya to attract investments: 
  Combining the government regulation and self-regulation policies 
  CBK should provide support to AMFI in reviewing regulations that can improve a 
sound microfinance environment, while at the same time, minimizing or removing 
regulatory constraints that discourage microfinance development 
  Enhancing information distribution processes that facilitate access to information 
on microfinance activities to reduce risks and improve MFI performance 
  Encouraging transformation of MFIs to Banks 
  Integrate continual learning processes for staff development and regularly 
reviewing organization development goals 
  Promoting professionalism in MFIs through management programs to improve 
financial performance and MFI capacity 
  Developing benchmarks for peer group evaluations 
  Strengthening efforts to ensure that the private sector is actively engaged and 
overall development of partnerships with stakeholders involved in the 
microfinance sector 
Finally, the preferred policy option of combining government regulation and self-
regulation will not only help close the financial gap that has greatly undermined the 
capabilities of MFIs in Kenya, but it will also attract MIF investment that will promote 
the development and expansion of microfinance activities in the country.  
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Annex a: Problem Tree Analysis 
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Annex b: Stakeholder Matrix 
 
Group Salience 
(Importance/Interest in issue) 
Power 
(Resources/Influence) 
Position on the issue 
(-3 to +3) 
Primary Stakeholders 
AMFI Capacity building of MFIs 
Reducing inefficiencies of delivery of microfinance 
Can lobby MFIs and GoK 
Has support of international agencies 
+3 
 
Tier 1 MFIs 
Need additional sources of capital to expand services Has resources or ability to raise resources from mobilizing savings 
Can lobby GoK and international agencies 
+2 
 
Tier 2 MFIs 
Need additional sources of capital 
Needs investors 
Has resources or ability to raise resources from international 
agencies 
Can lobby GoK and international agencies 
Has linkages with international organizations 
+2 
Tier 3 MFIs Need additional sources of capital 
Needs investors and guarantees 
Need technical assistances 
Little or no financial resources 
Can lobby international agencies 
Has linkages with international organizations 
+3 
Traditional Banks Need additional source of capital to expand their portfolio Has resources 
Can lobby GoK and private sector 
-3 
NBFIs Need additional sources of long term capital Has resources or ability to raise resources from mobilizing savings 
Can lobby GoK and interest groups 
-1 
Private sector Need accurate and timely information for financial decision on 
investments 
Has resources 
Can lobby business community 
+3 
Business community Need investors 
Need access to affordable capital 
Can pressure GoK and political groups 
Can lobby private sector and interest groups 
+3 
Interest groups Want to enhance their socio-economic wellbeing 
Want to access a wide range of financial services 
Has resources 
Can pressure GoK and political groups 
+3 
Excluded groups Need access to financial resources Has no resources 
Can lobby political groups 
+3 
Secondary Stakeholders 
Public sector agencies Develop financial market conditions 
Can improve business environment 
Regulatory and oversight body 
Can influence policy framework 
+2 
Political groups Want to enlarge the political base Can lobby GoK and international agencies 
Can influence policy framework 
+1 
NGOs Social motivation – want access to economic opportunities Has resources (financial and technical assistance) 
Can pressure GoK and political groups 
Can lobby international agencies 
+2 
Civil society Interested in the growth and development of financial sector 
Want increased access to investment opportunities 
Want access to affordable financial services 
Can pressure GoK and political groups 
Can lobby international agencies and excluded groups 
+3 
External Stakeholders 
International agencies Social interest and the reduction of poverty 
Interested in the growth and development of the financial sector 
Has resources (financial and technical assistance) 
Can pressure GoK 
+3 
Other public sector 
agencies 
Provision of basic infrastructure 
Ensuring the efficient use of resources 
Can influence policy framework 0 
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Annex c: List of 33 AMFI members 
 
  AMFI MEMBERS   
        
1 AAR Credit Services Nairobi 
2 ADOK TIMO  Kisumu 
3 Agakhan Foundation Nairobi 
4 AIG Insurance  Nairobi 
5 BIMAS  Embu 
6 CIC Insurance  Nairobi 
7 Co-operative Bank Nairobi 
8 ECLOF  Nairobi 
9 Elite Microfinance Mombasa 
10 Equity Bank  Nairobi 
11 Faulu Kenya  Nairobi 
12 Fusion Capital Ltd Nairobi 
13 Jamii Bora  Nairobi 
14 Jitegemea Credit Scheme Nairobi 
15 Jitegemee Trust  Nairobi 
16 K-rep Bank Ltd  Nairobi 
17 K-rep Development Agency Nairobi 
18 KADET  Nairobi 
19 Kenya Gatsby Trust Nairobi 
20 Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Nairobi 
21 Kenya Women Finance Trust Nairobi 
22 Micro Kenya Ltd  Nairobi 
23 Millenia Multipurpose credit Society Nakuru 
24 OIKO CREDIT  Nairobi 
25 Plan Internationa - Central/Nyaza Nairobi 
26 SISDO  Nairobi 
27 SMEP  Nairobi 
28 SNV  Nairobi 
29 SUNLINK  Nairobi 
30 Swiss Contact  Nairobi 
31 WEDCO  Kisumu 
32 WEEC  Kiserian 
33 Yehu Enterprises Support Services Kwale 
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Annex d: Kenya’s Demographic Data (1990 – 2006) 
 
Series Name 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
Population ages 0-14 (% of 
total) 
 
48.9 
 
48.4 
 
47.9 
 
47.4 
 
46.8 
 
46.3 
 
45.8 
 
45.3 
 
44.9 
 
44.4 
 
44.1 
 
43.7 
 
43.4 
 
43.1 
 
42.9 
 
42.8 
 
42.8 
 
Population ages 15-64 (% of 
total) 
 
48.4 
 
48.9 
 
49.4 
 
50.0 
 
50.5 
 
51.0 
 
51.5 
 
51.9 
 
52.4 
 
52.7 
 
53.1 
 
53.4 
 
53.8 
 
54.0 
 
54.2 
 
54.4 
 
54.4 
 
Population ages 65 and above 
(% of total) 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.7 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.9 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
2.8 
 
Population, female (% of total) 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.2 
 
50.1 
 
50.1 
 
50.0 
 
50.0 
 
49.9 
 
49.9 
 
Population, male (% of total) 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.9 
 
49.9 
 
50.0 
 
50.0 
 
50.1 
 
50.1 
 
Rural population (% of total 
population) 
 
81.8 
 
81.6 
 
81.5 
 
81.3 
 
81.2 
 
81 
 
80.9 
 
80.7 
 
80.6 
 
80.4 
 
80.3 
 
80.1 
 
79.9 
 
79.7 
 
79.5 
 
79.3 
 
79 
 
Urban population (% of total) 
 
18.2 
 
18.4 
 
18.5 
 
18.7 
 
18.8 
 
19 
 
19.1 
 
19.3 
 
19.4 
 
19.6 
 
19.7 
 
19.9 
 
20.1 
 
20.3 
 
20.5 
 
20.7 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (WDI 2007) 
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Annex e: Evaluation of alternatives 
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Status Quo Regulation 
Limited access to sources of capital. Larger MFIs can attract 
investments easily, while smaller MFIs struggle to attract 
investors and are unsustainable 
Weak governance structures overseeing microfinance 
activities 
Unequal distribution of microfinance resources 
High transaction costs of delivering microfinance services 
Low institutional capacity 
Lack of transparency and accountability of MFI operations 
Lack of performance standards 
Improved governance structures overseeing microfinance activities 
Better distribution of microfinance resource 
Improved access to sources of capital 
Enhanced transparency and accountability of MFI operations 
High transaction costs of delivering microfinance service due to 
increased cost of compliance 
Reduce ability of smaller MFIs to compete leading to a some of MFIs 
stopping their service delivery 
Reduced supply of microfinance services 
 
Self-regulation Combination (Government and Self-regulation) 
Better self-regulated environment 
Better administrative efficiency of MFIs in delivering 
microfinance  
Improved distribution of microfinance resources 
Improved access to sources of capital 
Better transparency and accountability of MFI operations 
Reduced operation costs of providing microfinance services 
Improved professional management and performance of MFIs 
and microfinance resources 
Well self-regulated environment due to the higher incentives and 
benefits of having more access to investors/investment opportunities 
Enhanced administrative efficiency of MFIs in delivering 
microfinance  
Better equitable distribution of microfinance resources 
Greater access to a variety of sources of capital/investors 
Better transparency and accountability of MFI operations 
Reduced operation costs of providing microfinance services 
Improved professional management and performance of MFIs and 
microfinance resources 
 
Annex f: Impact of Policy Alternatives 
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Annex g: Analysis of Policy Alternatives on MFIs and MIFs 
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Annex h: Policy outcome of preferred policy option 
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Fund Name 
Country of 
Incorporation Fund Assets (US$) 
% of Fund Assets 
allocated to MF 
Investments 
Number of Active 
MF Investments 
Projected new Funds 
allocated to MF 
Investments MIF Categories 
1 Luxmint - ADA Luxembourg $2,107,728 100.0% 18 $947,905 DF 
2 DBMDF United States $3,259,923 86.8% 28 $1,000,000 DF 
3 FIG Switzerland $3,481,771 72.1% 17 - DF 
4 Kolibri Kapital ASA Norway $3,900,000 25.3% 5 $4,000,000 DF 
5 CRESUD Italy $3,958,650 66.7% 12 $1,979,325 DF 
6 Goodwell Netherlands, The $4,500,000 100.0% 0 $12,000,000 CO 
7 Dignity Fund, L.P. United States $5,495,000 91.0% 8 $5,000,000 C 
8 ICCO Netherlands, The $6,496,272 72.9% 20 - CO/DF 
9 Unitus United States $9,477,119 n/a 8 - CO/DF 
10 INCOFIN Belgium $10,556,400 96.3% 19 $5,278,200 DF 
11 Rabobank Netherlands, The $12,180,900 78.2% 89 - CO/DF 
12 SIDI France $12,652,433 38.1% 37 - DF 
13 I&P Developpement France $12,665,300 n/a 8 $8,865,710 CO 
14 Advans SA Luxembourg $12,938,814 100.0% 2 $4,861,722 CO 
15 ACCION Investments Cayman Islands $12,969,985 96.5% 5 $5,000,000 CO 
16 AfriCap Mauritius $13,300,000 24.1% 3 - CO 
17 OTI United States $13,500,000 n/a 13 $5,000,000 DF 
18 St. Honore Microfinance Fund Luxembourg $15,874,783 53.5% 6 $15,000,000 C 
19 ALTERFIN Belgium $18,347,647 38.2% 36 - DF 
20 Consorzio Etimos Italy $21,380,343 66.5% 107 - DF 
21 Impulse (Incofin) Belgium $23,751,900 97.2% 22 $3,298,875 C 
22 MicroVest I United States $24,230,000 93.2% 25 $7,500,000 C 
23 Oxfam Novib Fund Netherlands, The $28,125,000 100.0% 77 - CO 
24 ShoreCap Intl. United States $28,333,000 37.6% 9 $2,500,000 CO/DF 
25 TFSF Netherlands, The $31,884,269 70.2% 18 $7,917,300 CO 
26 Rural Impulse Fund Belgium $38,000,000 0.0% 0 $38,000,000 CO 
27 HTF Netherlands, The $39,968,387 93.0% 37 $3,958,650 DF 
28 KEF South Africa $48,550,000 n/a - $20,480,000 DF 
29 CMI Netherlands, The $50,000,000 100.0% 7 $15,000,000 CO 
30 Dual Return Fund Luxembourg $50,586,594 83.7% 55 $15,000,000 C 
31 Triodos-Doen Foundation Netherlands, The $56,593,726 79.9% 74 $6,597,750 DF 
32 Citigroup Foundation United States $63,000,000 n/a 42 $2,400,000 DF 
33 CORDAID Netherlands, The $63,473,991 54.6% 90 $9,473,730 CO 
34 Gray Ghost United States $75,000,000 100.0% 16 - C 
35 Calvert Foundation United States $106,258,735 25.6% 50 $12,000,000 DF 
36 Dexia Microcredit Fund Luxembourg $161,837,903 66.7% 105 $20,000,000 C 
37 responsAbility Fund Luxembourg $180,141,111 88.2% 132 - C 
38 Oikocredit Netherlands, The $455,786,000 43.5% 306 $131,674,000 DF 
39 BIO Belgium - n/a 16 - CO/DF 
40 DEG Germany - n/a 9 - CO 
41 Fundació Un Sol Món Spain - n/a 16 $642,235 CO 
42 KFW Germany - n/a 99 - DF 
43 UNCDF United States - n/a 12 $4,500,000 DF 
44 USAID Credit Guarantees United States - n/a 25 - DF 
45 VDK MFI Loan Portfolio Belgium - n/a - $32,988,750 CO 
  TOTAL   $1,724,563,684   1683 $402,864,152   
*The highlighted microfinance investment funds are incorporated in Africa 
Annex i: List of 45 MIFs invested in Africa 
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Fund Name 
Country of Incorporation Fund Assets (US$) % of Size 
Number of Active MF 
Investments % of MIFs 
% of Fund Assets 
allocated to MF 
Investments 
Projected new Funds 
allocated to MF 
Investments 
1 Luxmint - ADA Luxembourg $2,107,728 0.12% 18 1.20% 100.0% $947,905 
2 DBMDF United States $3,259,923 0.19% 28 1.86% 86.8% $1,000,000 
3 FIG Switzerland $3,481,771 0.20% 17 1.13% 72.1% - 
4 Kolibri Kapital ASA Norway $3,900,000 0.23% 5 0.33% 25.3% $4,000,000 
5 CRESUD Italy $3,958,650 0.23% 12 0.80% 66.7% $1,979,325 
6 Goodwell Netherlands, The $4,500,000 0.26% 0 0.00% 100.0% $12,000,000 
7 Dignity Fund, L.P. United States $5,495,000 0.32% 8 0.53% 91.0% $5,000,000 
8 ICCO Netherlands, The $6,496,272 0.38% 20 1.33% 72.9% - 
9 Unitus United States $9,477,119 0.55% 8 0.53% n/a - 
10 INCOFIN Belgium $10,556,400 0.61% 19 1.26% 96.3% $5,278,200 
11 Rabobank Netherlands, The $12,180,900 0.71% 89 5.91% 78.2% - 
12 SIDI France $12,652,433 0.73% 37 2.46% 38.1% - 
13 I&P Developpement France $12,665,300 0.73% 8 0.53% n/a $8,865,710 
14 Advans SA Luxembourg $12,938,814 0.75% 2 0.13% 100.0% $4,861,722 
15 ACCION Investments Cayman Islands $12,969,985 0.75% 5 0.33% 96.5% $5,000,000 
16 AfriCap Mauritius $13,300,000 0.77% 3 0.20% 24.1% - 
17 OTI United States $13,500,000 0.78% 13 0.86% n/a $5,000,000 
18 St. Honore Microfinance Fund Luxembourg $15,874,783 0.92% 6 0.40% 53.5% $15,000,000 
19 ALTERFIN Belgium $18,347,647 1.06% 36 2.39% 38.2% - 
20 Consorzio Etimos Italy $21,380,343 1.24% 107 7.10% 66.5% - 
21 Impulse (Incofin) Belgium $23,751,900 1.38% 22 1.46% 97.2% $3,298,875 
22 MicroVest I United States $24,230,000 1.40% 25 1.66% 93.2% $7,500,000 
23 Oxfam Novib Fund Netherlands, The $28,125,000 1.63% 77 5.11% 100.0% - 
24 ShoreCap Intl. United States $28,333,000 1.64% 9 0.60% 37.6% $2,500,000 
25 TFSF Netherlands, The $31,884,269 1.85% 18 1.20% 70.2% $7,917,300 
26 Rural Impulse Fund Belgium $38,000,000 2.20% 0 0.00% 0.0% $38,000,000 
27 HTF Netherlands, The $39,968,387 2.32% 37 2.46% 93.0% $3,958,650 
28 KEF South Africa $48,550,000 2.82% - - n/a $20,480,000 
29 CMI Netherlands, The $50,000,000 2.90% 7 0.46% 100.0% $15,000,000 
30 Dual Return Fund Luxembourg $50,586,594 2.93% 55 3.65% 83.7% $15,000,000 
31 Triodos-Doen Foundation Netherlands, The $56,593,726 3.28% 74 4.91% 79.9% $6,597,750 
32 Citigroup Foundation United States $63,000,000 3.65% 42 2.79% n/a $2,400,000 
33 CORDAID Netherlands, The $63,473,991 3.68% 90 5.98% 54.6% $9,473,730 
34 Gray Ghost United States $75,000,000 4.35% 16 1.06% 100.0% - 
35 Calvert Foundation United States $106,258,735 6.16% 50 3.32% 25.6% $12,000,000 
36 Dexia Microcredit Fund Luxembourg $161,837,903 9.38% 105 6.97% 66.7% $20,000,000 
37 responsAbility Fund Luxembourg $180,141,111 10.45% 132 8.76% 88.2% - 
38 Oikocredit Netherlands, The $455,786,000 26.43% 306 20.32% 43.5% $131,674,000 
  TOTAL   $1,724,563,684 100% 1506 100%   $364,733,167 
 
Annex j: List of 38 MIFs that reported their total asset and share of fund allocation 
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Fund Name Country of Incorporation Fund Assets (US$) 
% of Fund Assets allocated 
to MF Investments 
Number of Active MF 
Investments 
Projected new Funds 
allocated to MF Investments MIF Categories 
Number of Active MF 
Investments in Africa 
1 Luxmint - ADA Luxembourg $2,107,728 100.0% 18 $947,905 DF 4 
2 DBMDF United States $3,259,923 86.8% 28 $1,000,000 DF 5 
3 FIG Switzerland $3,481,771 72.1% 17 - DF 4 
4 Kolibri Kapital ASA Norway $3,900,000 25.3% 5 $4,000,000 DF   
5 CRESUD Italy $3,958,650 66.7% 12 $1,979,325 DF 3 
6 Goodwell Netherlands, The $4,500,000 100.0% 0 $12,000,000 CO   
7 Dignity Fund, L.P. United States $5,495,000 91.0% 8 $5,000,000 C   
8 ICCO Netherlands, The $6,496,272 72.9% 20 - CO/DF 3 
9 Unitus United States $9,477,119 n/a 8 - CO/DF 1 
10 INCOFIN Belgium $10,556,400 96.3% 19 $5,278,200 DF 6 
11 Rabobank Netherlands, The $12,180,900 78.2% 89 - CO/DF 10 
12 SIDI France $12,652,433 38.1% 37 - DF 7 
13 I&P Developpement France $12,665,300 n/a 8 $8,865,710 CO 4 
14 Advans SA Luxembourg $12,938,814 100.0% 2 $4,861,722 CO 1 
15 ACCION Investments Cayman Islands $12,969,985 96.5% 5 $5,000,000 CO   
16 AfriCap Mauritius $13,300,000 24.1% 3 - CO 11 
17 OTI United States $13,500,000 n/a 13 $5,000,000 DF 2 
18 
St. Honore Microfinance 
Fund Luxembourg $15,874,783 53.5% 6 $15,000,000 C   
19 ALTERFIN Belgium $18,347,647 38.2% 36 - DF 1 
20 Consorzio Etimos Italy $21,380,343 66.5% 107 - DF 8 
21 Impulse (Incofin) Belgium $23,751,900 97.2% 22 $3,298,875 C 3 
22 MicroVest I United States $24,230,000 93.2% 25 $7,500,000 C   
23 Oxfam Novib Fund Netherlands, The $28,125,000 100.0% 77 - CO 10 
24 ShoreCap Intl. United States $28,333,000 37.6% 9 $2,500,000 CO/DF 2 
25 TFSF Netherlands, The $31,884,269 70.2% 18 $7,917,300 CO 2 
26 Rural Impulse Fund Belgium $38,000,000 0.0% 0 $38,000,000 CO   
27 HTF Netherlands, The $39,968,387 93.0% 37 $3,958,650 DF 5 
28 KEF South Africa $48,550,000 n/a - $20,480,000 DF   
29 CMI Netherlands, The $50,000,000 100.0% 7 $15,000,000 CO 2 
30 Dual Return Fund Luxembourg $50,586,594 83.7% 55 $15,000,000 C   
31 Triodos-Doen Foundation Netherlands, The $56,593,726 79.9% 74 $6,597,750 DF 6 
32 Citigroup Foundation United States $63,000,000 n/a 42 $2,400,000 DF   
33 CORDAID Netherlands, The $63,473,991 54.6% 90 $9,473,730 CO 4 
34 Gray Ghost United States $75,000,000 100.0% 16 - C   
35 Calvert Foundation United States $106,258,735 25.6% 50 $12,000,000 DF 39 
36 Dexia Microcredit Fund Luxembourg $161,837,903 66.7% 105 $20,000,000 C 10 
37 responsAbility Fund Luxembourg $180,141,111 88.2% 132 - C 5 
38 Oikocredit Netherlands, The $455,786,000 43.5% 306 $131,674,000 DF 12 
39 BIO Belgium - n/a 16 - CO/DF   
40 DEG Germany - n/a 9 - CO   
41 Fundació Un Sol Món Spain - n/a 16 $642,235 CO 3 
42 KFW Germany - n/a 99 - DF 9 
43 UNCDF United States - n/a 12 $4,500,000 DF 10 
44 USAID Credit Guarantees United States - n/a 25 - DF 8 
45 VDK MFI Loan Portfolio Belgium - n/a - $32,988,750 CO   
  TOTAL   $1,724,563,684   1683 $402,864,152   200 
Annex k: Categories of MIFs invested in Africa 
*Highlighted Acronyms 
 C – Commercial microfinance investment funds 
 CO – Commercially oriented microfinance investment funds 
 DF – Microfinance development funds 
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Fund Name Fund Assets (US$) 
% of Fund Assets 
allocated to MF 
Investments 
Number of Active 
MF Investments 
Number of Active 
MF Investments 
in Africa 
MIF 
Categories Lending Instruments Eligible Partners 
1 Luxmint - ADA $2,107,728 100.0% 18 4 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
2 DBMDF $3,259,923 86.8% 28 5 DF Loans Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
3 FIG $3,481,771 72.1% 17 4 DF Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
4 Kolibri Kapital ASA $3,900,000 25.3% 5  DF    
5 CRESUD $3,958,650 66.7% 12 3 DF Loans NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
6 Goodwell $4,500,000 100.0% 0  CO    
7 Dignity Fund, L.P. $5,495,000 91.0% 8  C    
8 ICCO $6,496,272 72.9% 20 3 CO/DF Loans, Equity, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Rural Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
9 Unitus $9,477,119 n/a 8 1 CO/DF Loans, Equity, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, NGOs 
10 INCOFIN $10,556,400 96.3% 19 6 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
11 Rabobank $12,180,900 78.2% 89 10 CO/DF Loans, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
12 SIDI $12,652,433 38.1% 37 7 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
13 I&P Developpement $12,665,300 n/a 8 4 CO Loans, Equity Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
14 Advans SA $12,938,814 100.0% 2 1 CO Loans, Equity, Gaurantees, TA   
15 ACCION Investments $12,969,985 96.5% 5  CO    
16 AfriCap $13,300,000 24.1% 11 11 CO Equity, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, NGOs 
17 OTI $13,500,000 n/a 13 2 DF Loans, Equity   
18 St. Honore Microfinance Fund $15,874,783 53.5% 6  C    
19 ALTERFIN $18,347,647 38.2% 36 1 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
20 Consorzio Etimos $21,380,343 66.5% 107 8 DF Loans, TA   
21 Impulse (Incofin) $23,751,900 97.2% 22 3 C Loans, Equity, Gaurantees Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
22 MicroVest I $24,230,000 93.2% 25  C    
23 Oxfam Novib Fund $28,125,000 100.0% 77 10 CO Loans, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
24 ShoreCap Intl. $28,333,000 37.6% 9 2 CO/DF Loans, Equity, TA Bank, Rural Bank, NBFI 
25 TFSF $31,884,269 70.2% 18 2 CO Loans, Equity Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union 
26 Rural Impulse Fund $38,000,000 0.0% 0  CO    
27 HTF $39,968,387 93.0% 37 5 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees  Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
28 KEF $48,550,000 n/a -  DF    
29 CMI $50,000,000 100.0% 7 2 CO Equity  Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
30 Dual Return Fund $50,586,594 83.7% 55  C    
31 Triodos-Doen Foundation $56,593,726 79.9% 74 6 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees  Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
32 Citigroup Foundation $63,000,000 n/a 42  DF Grants, Gaurantees, TA NGOs 
33 CORDAID $63,473,991 54.6% 90 4 CO Loans, Equity, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
34 Gray Ghost $75,000,000 100.0% 16  C    
35 Calvert Foundation $106,258,735 25.6% 50 39 DF    
36 Dexia Microcredit Fund $161,837,903 66.7% 105 10 C Loans, Gaurantees Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
37 responsAbility Fund $180,141,111 88.2% 132 5 C Loans, Equity Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
38 Oikocredit $455,786,000 43.5% 306 12 DF Loans, Equity, Gaurantees, TA  Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
39 BIO - n/a 16  CO/DF    
40 DEG - n/a 9  CO    
41 Fundació Un Sol Món - n/a 16 3 CO Loans, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
42 KFW - n/a 99 9 DF Loans, Equity, Grants, Gaurantees, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
43 UNCDF - n/a 12 10 DF Loans, Grants, TA Bank, NBFI, Cooperative/Credit Union, NGOs 
44 USAID Credit Guarantees - n/a 25 8 DF Gaurantees   
45 VDK MFI Loan Portfolio - n/a -  CO    
  TOTAL $1,724,563,684   1691 200       
Annex l: MIFs lending instruments 
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Rating: A1 
The political and economic situation is very good. A quality business environment has a positive influence on corporate payment 
behavior. Corporate default probability is very low on average. 
 
Rating: A2 
The political and economic situation is good. A basically stable and efficient business environment nonetheless leaves room for 
improvement. Corporate default probability is low on average.  
 
Rating: A3 
Changes in generally good but somewhat volatile political and economic environment can affect corporate payment behavior. A 
basically secure business environment can nonetheless give rise to occasional difficulties for companies. Corporate default probability 
is quite acceptable on average. 
 
Rating: A4 
A somewhat shaky political and economic outlook and a relatively volatile business environment can affect corporate payment 
behavior. Corporate default probability is still acceptable on average. 
 
Rating: B 
Political and economic uncertainties and an occasionally difficult business environment can affect corporate payment behavior. 
Corporate default probability is appreciable.  
 
Rating: C 
A very uncertain political and economic outlook and a business environment with many troublesome weaknesses can have a 
significant impact on corporate payment behavior. Corporate default probability is high. 
 
Rating: D 
A high-risk political and economic situation and an often very difficult business environment can have a very significant impact on 
corporate payment behavior. Corporate default probability is very high.  
 
Annex m: Coface Country Risk Rating 
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Economy 
Ease of Doing 
Business Rank Starting a Business 
Protecting 
Investors Paying Taxes 
Singapore 1 9 2 2 
New Zealand 2 3 1 9 
United States 3 4 5 76 
Hong Kong, China 4 13 3 3 
Denmark 5 18 19 13 
United Kingdom 6 6 9 12 
Canada 7 2 5 25 
Ireland 8 5 5 6 
Australia 9 1 51 41 
Iceland 10 14 64 27 
Norway 11 28 15 16 
Japan 12 44 12 105 
Finland 13 16 51 83 
Sweden 14 22 51 42 
Thailand 15 36 33 89 
Switzerland 16 35 158 15 
Estonia 17 20 33 31 
Georgia 18 10 33 102 
Belgium 19 19 12 65 
Germany 20 71 83 67 
Netherlands 21 41 98 36 
Latvia 22 30 51 20 
Saudi Arabia 23 36 50 7 
Malaysia 24 74 4 56 
Austria 25 83 122 80 
Lithuania 26 57 83 71 
Mauritius 27 8 11 11 
Puerto Rico 28 7 12 39 
Israel 29 17 5 69 
Korea 30 110 64 106 
France 31 12 64 82 
Slovakia 32 72 98 122 
Chile 33 39 33 34 
St. Lucia 34 45 19 32 
South Africa 35 53 9 61 
Fiji 36 69 33 52 
Portugal 37 38 33 66 
Spain 38 118 83 93 
Armenia 39 47 83 143 
Kuwait 40 121 19 8 
Antigua and Barbuda 41 27 19 108 
Luxembourg 42 41 107 17 
Namibia 43 101 64 48 
Mexico 44 75 33 135 
Hungary 45 67 107 127 
Bulgaria 46 100 33 88 
Tonga 47 24 98 24 
Romania 48 26 33 134 
Oman 49 107 64 5 
Taiwan, China 50 103 64 91 
Botswana 51 99 107 14 
Mongolia 52 62 19 90 
Italy 53 65 51 122 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 54 32 19 58 
Slovenia 55 120 19 63 
Czech Republic 56 91 83 113 
Turkey 57 43 64 54 
Peru 58 102 15 77 
Belize 59 116 107 47 
Maldives 60 34 64 1 
Samoa 61 104 19 53 
Vanuatu 62 73 64 18 
Jamaica 63 11 64 170 
Annex n: Doing Business Index 
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Economy 
 
Ease of Doing 
Business Rank Starting a Business 
Protecting 
Investors Paying Taxes 
St. Kitts and Nevis 64 79 19 85 
Panama 65 31 98 169 
Colombia 66 88 19 167 
Trinidad and Tobago 67 40 15 45 
United Arab Emirates 68 158 107 4 
El Salvador 69 130 107 101 
Grenada 70 32 19 59 
Kazakhstan 71 57 51 44 
Kenya 72 112 83 154 
Kiribati 73 86 33 10 
Poland 74 129 33 125 
Macedonia, FYR 75 21 83 99 
Pakistan 76 59 19 146 
Dominica 77 23 19 64 
Brunei 78 117 121 28 
Solomon Islands 79 85 51 26 
Jordan 80 133 107 19 
Montenegro 81 98 19 129 
Palau 82 56 165 73 
China 83 135 83 168 
Papua New Guinea 84 76 33 79 
Lebanon 85 132 83 33 
Serbia 86 90 64 121 
Ghana 87 138 33 75 
Tunisia 88 68 147 148 
Marshall Islands 89 15 147 74 
Seychelles 90 48 51 35 
Vietnam 91 97 165 128 
Moldova 92 81 98 111 
Nicaragua 93 70 83 156 
Kyrgyz Republic 94 49 33 152 
Swaziland 95 142 175 40 
Azerbaijan 96 64 107 141 
Croatia 97 93 122 43 
Uruguay 98 151 83 131 
Dominican Republic 99 84 122 139 
Greece 100 152 158 86 
Sri Lanka 101 29 64 158 
Ethiopia 102 106 107 29 
Paraguay 103 66 51 93 
Guyana 104 86 64 100 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 105 150 83 142 
Russia 106 50 83 130 
Bangladesh 107 92 15 81 
Nigeria 108 80 51 107 
Argentina 109 114 98 147 
Belarus 110 119 98 178 
Nepal 111 60 64 92 
Micronesia 112 46 165 70 
Yemen 113 175 122 84 
Guatemala 114 128 122 116 
Costa Rica 115 113 158 162 
Zambia 116 82 64 30 
West Bank and Gaza 117 166 33 22 
Uganda 118 114 122 55 
Bhutan 119 52 122 68 
India 120 111 33 165 
Honduras 121 135 147 160 
Brazil 122 122 64 137 
Indonesia 123 168 51 110 
Lesotho 124 126 141 49 
Algeria 125 131 64 157 
Egypt 126 55 83 150 
Malawi 127 108 64 78 
Annex n.1: Doing Business Index 
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Economy 
 
Ease of Doing 
Business Rank Starting a Business 
Protecting 
Investors Paying Taxes 
Ecuador 128 148 122 57 
Morocco 129 51 158 132 
Tanzania 130 95 83 104 
Gambia 131 94 165 173 
Cape Verde 132 156 122 117 
Philippines 133 144 141 126 
Mozambique 134 125 33 72 
Iran 135 77 158 97 
Albania 136 123 165 118 
Syria 137 169 107 98 
Uzbekistan 138 54 107 159 
Ukraine 139 109 141 177 
Bolivia 140 157 122 172 
Iraq 141 164 107 37 
Suriname 142 163 174 23 
Sudan 143 95 141 60 
Gabon 144 147 147 93 
Cambodia 145 162 64 21 
Djibouti 146 165 173 51 
Comoros 147 145 122 46 
Haiti 148 170 158 96 
Madagascar 149 61 51 86 
Rwanda 150 63 165 50 
Benin 151 137 147 161 
Zimbabwe 152 143 107 144 
Tajikistan 153 161 176 155 
Cameroon 154 160 107 166 
Côte d'Ivoire 155 155 147 140 
Togo 156 176 138 138 
Mauritania 157 167 141 171 
Mali 158 149 147 151 
Afghanistan 159 24 178 38 
Sierra Leone 160 89 98 145 
Burkina Faso 161 105 138 133 
Senegal 162 159 158 164 
São Tomé and Principe 163 126 122 153 
Lao PDR 164 78 176 114 
Equatorial Guinea 165 172 141 136 
Guinea 166 171 165 163 
Angola 167 173 51 120 
Timor-Leste 168 140 122 62 
Niger 169 153 147 115 
Liberia 170 141 138 119 
Eritrea 171 174 98 103 
Venezuela 172 134 165 174 
Chad 173 177 122 124 
Burundi 174 124 147 109 
Congo, Rep. 175 154 147 176 
Guinea-Bissau 176 178 122 112 
Central African Republic 177 139 122 175 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 178 146 147 149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex n.2: Doing Business Index 
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